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INTRODUCTIOl'f
EYer since St. Anselm wrote the Proslosion. the argument
tor the existence ot God therein contained bas been commented

upon and disputed by both major and m1aor philosophera.

So.e

have brierly expressed their thoughts on it; others have written
l.ngt~

monographs; tew completel,. ignore it.

The many, varied

op1n1ona expressed over the centuries may be .een in such historical studies as Augustinus Daniel's Ge_chioh'e der Gottesbewei.e

!!

Dreia.bat_a K~rhundtrt,l Geors Grunwald's Ge.chicht. ~

gotte.bewel.e !! H&~telalter,2 aDd Alvin Piantinsa·. recent !b!

Ontolgsica~ ArSU'ent,3 which includes tbe comments of .odern and
co.temporary philosophers.

Books, artlcles, and pamphlets writ-

ten on the subject are numerous enough to torm a small library.
The issues are clearly defined; the cups are set.

~,then,

should more be written on the subject?
Recently, Norman Malcolm ot Oornell University and Obarle.
Hartshorne ot the University of Texas have raised the new issue
ot bow many arguments there are.

They both maintain that AD.elm

lAugust1nus Daniels, O.S.B., "Qeschichte der Gottesbewelse 1m Dreizebnten Jahrhundert, It Beitraes! .I.!l£ Qeschichte der
PhilosoRQ1! der Mittelalter (VIII, t-2; Muenstirz~cK.Daort1iCh.
luchaverliiiidluult 19t59'.
2 Georg Grunwald, ~Geschicht. der Gottesbewe1se 1m M1ttelalter," Be&traese iurhGesCh!Chte der Pbilo8oph1e der Mittelalter
(VI, 3; AUenater, sc enaorff8che-,ucfisverSan~lung, 1967'.
3Alv1~ Planting., !h, Ontological Arsument (New York: Doubleday. 1965).

2

has two

argumen~8:

one trom contingent existence and another trom

necessary existence.

According to them, it properly understood,

the second argument does not exhibit the admitted weakness of
the first.

The purpose ot this paper 1s to investlgate this nev

issue concerning the number of arguments and to give a critique

at the views ot Malcolm and Hartshorne on the validity of what
they consider is a second argument.

In conformity with this pur-

pose, the author, while realislng the vast literature on the
Anselmian argument, limits himself chiefly to the writings ot
Anselm, Malcolm, Hartshorne, and the current critiques ot the
latter ments positions.

The procedure is to give an exposition

ot the foundations ot the argument in the writings ot St. Anselm,
the arguBlent itselt, the argumentation ot Malcol. and Hartshorne,
and tinally a critique ot their positions.

CHAPTER I
FOUNDATIONS O.F THE AN!3.ELMIAN AHGUMENT

IN AN3EUi'S WRITINGS

Charle. Hartshorne asks what Anselm .eant by "greatness"
in the famous formula, "a being, than whioh nothing greater can

be thought," which appears in the second chapter ot the Pro!log10n. l !his specitic question should be placed in the larger

context of the aeaning ot the entire formula.

In Anselm's Mono.r

12810n the answers to the spec1fic question and the question of
the meaning of the whole formula can be tound.

Why

An.ela torrau-

lated his idea of God the way he did is partial17 due to his coSnitional theory.

It is said that Ansel.'s theor,J ot truth 18 the

hidden nerve running through the argumentation 1n the Mono!osioD
and Proslogion2 and that his cognitional theory provides a foundation tor his entire thougbt. 3 Both Ans.lats cognitional theor,
and

Monologlo~,

then, require investigation as propaedeutic to

the argument in the ProsloSion.
lObarles Hartsborne, The ~ ~t Pertection and Other
i8!!ls in Neoclassioal MetapPjii~iilie, !l!Inolsr-open
ao~. I96~', p. 35.
2Etienne Gilson and Phl10theua Boehner, aeschichte der
Ohristlionen Philo.oph1a (2d eel. rav.; 1?aderborzu FeraInanrnchoenIDih. 19$~'. II, p. 299.
3Robert 1111ler,
Anselm and Descartes,"
p.

345.

a.S.B.,

~

"!he Ontologionl A.rgument in St.
Modern Schoolman, XXXII (May. 1955),
3

4

Since Anselm did not write a comprehensive treatise on

cognit:i.on, his eognitional

tlv:~ory

!!lust be culled from his

itate and trom snatches of his other writings.

R!. !.!!£-

-

The DeVerltate

is a dialogue between Anselm and one of his students on the topiC

ot "what truth ls, and of what things it is ordinarily predicated, and what justice 18.,,4
his statement in the

Anselm's student was puzzled by

a beginning or an end and that
truth. • t.5

that truth

Monolo5io~
tt

d06S

not have either

'nothing can be true without

Sinoe God is truth and every true thing is a partici-

patlon in truth, the student wishes to know whether or not God
is the truth or every true thing or statement.

This leads to

the question of what truth 1s.
Anselm

d08S

not answer immediately.

Slowly he proceeds

to formulate a suitable definition, beginning with an inquiry
into the truth Qf statements, proceeding to the truth ot opinion,
the will. natural and unnatural actions, the senses, the essenoes

ot things, and tinally the definition itself.
Statements are true in two ways: by nature, by both nature
and an actual affirmation that something that is, is, or that

something that is not, is not.

Each coherent statement has its

truth. its signification, regardless ot whether or not the signification correotly reters to the condition ot what i9 8i8ni•

4Anselm, "De Ver1tate." Selections trom Medieval Philosoabers. ed. and triiis~ IIchard Moleon (New 'fori: '*enarIii ~crlY;::
ner'. Sons. 1929), It 150. further quotationa are from this
translation.

5~ •• p. 152.

5
tied.
As

S\.

Thus, the statement "it is raining" has a true meaning.
statement it can be understood. by anyone cognizant ot Ehg-

lisb who has lived, 1s now living, or will live.

is natural.

In this sense even a. 11e is true.

Such a truth

Whether the

statement correctly reters to the presence of rain drops actuall7
taIling at the same time the utterance is made, is another ques-

tion.
Ansela's student, who holds that the thing stated 1s the
cause ,of a true statement, supposes that truth is found only in
statements.

Anselm, however, argues to a de.per meaning of truth

than natural truth.

Bis dialectical progression is here quoted,

because it introduces a key Dotion in Anselm's doctrine of truth
and in his philosophy

8S

a whole.

£ist. What then does truth in state.ent seem to you to be?
".se. I know nothing other than that when it signifies that
that whloh is ls, then truth is in it, and it 18 true.
;s~. to what end is an f.l.ffirmation made?
ac. to signity that that which is ia.
~. Then it should d.o that?
mac. Certainly.
Fliii. Then when it signifies thst that which ls ls, it signifies as lt should?
That is clear.
s • But when it signifies as it should it signifies rightly?

-Btii.

~.

~.

Disc.

5.'6.
~Si.

--!-.

Dlsq.

!hilt 1s so.
HoweTer, when it signities rightly, the significat10n
1s right?
There 18 no doubt of that.
fteretore, when it signifies tb.at that whioh is is,
the s1pitioatlon 18 ri.ght?
That tollows.
Likewise when it signifies that that which is is, the
Signification is true?
Yes, it i8 both right and true, when it signifies that
that which is is.

6
Mast. It is the same, therefore, for the affirmation to be

right and true, that is, to signify that that which 1s
1s?
Disc. Yes, it is the same.
Sst. Consequently, truth, for it, is not other than rightness.
6
Disc. I see clearly now that truth is this rightness.

-

Rightness or rectitude 1s the major criterion tor the truth ot a
statement.

In the conformity ot a statement to the objective

reality of the thing signified lies the truth ot the statement.
Though all coherent statements are naturally true, they may be
both true and right it they affirm and deny what they ought to.
According to nature, a statement is always true; according to
use, it may be either true or talse, according to whether or not
it signifies what it was made to Signify; namely, that what is
is and what 1s not 1s not.

fore d1tterent.

These truths are separable and there-

The double rectitude mayor may not be there.

Yet in some instances, such as in the statements "Man 1s an animal tt or "Man is not a stone," 7 the double truth is &lv83'S had,
because they always actually slgnify what they are made to slg-

niry.

What applies to verbal communioation applies to all torma

of communication which use signs "tor si.gnity'ing that something
1s or is not. H8
Truth is also said to be in the area ot thought and opinion.

Anselm's argumentation 1s brief.
6

~.,

pp. 153-154.

7Ibid., p. 155.
8 Ibid., p. 156.

'I'be reason lIan has the

?
power to think is to enable him to think that what is is and what
is not is not, which means to think as he ought.
is the key note.

Again rightness

When a thought corresponds to reality and real-

ity exists in the manner it is thought to exist, the thought i8
tl'UG, tor ttthere is no other truth or thought than rightness. ,,9
It is also said that the will is true.

Anselm investi-

gates the truth ot the will, finding the familiar solution.
the will, truth is "nothing exoept rightness."lO

In

Both angels

and men were given wills to be used tor willing what they should.
Satan and his followers abandoned truth and rightness only when
they willed what they should not have willed.

Moreover, aotions bave truth.

Arguing trom Scripture

Anselm affirms that doing good is the same as doing the true.
But. aocording to the opinion

or

all men, he who does good and

acts truly also does as he should.

Aoting as he should. he acts

rightly, "wheretore nothing is more apparent than that the truth
of action is rightness."ll

Actions. however, may be either de-

termined or undetermined by nature.

Those proceeding trom the

intellect and will are naturally undetermined. because they may
or may not be done the way they should; whereas involuntary acts,
such as the warming of tire. are necessarily determined by the
nature of the agent.

9~ •• p. 157.
lOIbid.
llIbid •• p. 158.

8

Similarly there is determined and undetermined truth in
sensation.

The senses seem to deceive us otten.

They report,

tor instance, that a mants tace is in a mirror, even though be
knows hin race remains with himself, and that a straight rod 1s
crooked when placed in water.

Anselm distinguishes sense impres-

sions from the interpretation ot them, maintaining that the senses report what they are by nature made to report, do what they
should, and have both truth and rightness.

Error creeps in when

the mind improperly judges the truth presented by the sense organs.

Anselm·s treatment ot sensation and the genesiS ot an idea
as a whole require further elucidation.

A man senses, because

he bas a body; a man has ideas partly because he has a body,
partly because he has a soul.
Not restricted to anyone part ot the body, the soul permeates, suffuses, and enlivens the whole body, being entirely
i tael! in the whole as well as in all of the

pa.rts.

"For, it

the soul were not as a whole in tho separate members ot the body,
it would not fe;~l as a whole in the separate members. 1112

~e

soul baa several aspects--intellect and will--which, on account

ot their not being coextensive with it and their having special
activities, are dirferent trom it. 13

Both the intellect and will

12Anselm, tfProslofion," ch. 13. St. Anselm, ed .. and trans.
Sidney Deane (2d ed.; C~cago: Open Court. 193$), p. 20. All
fUrther English quotations are taken trom this edition, unless
otherwise noted.
l3Anselm, "De concordia Rraesclentiae ~. ~raedestinatlonlJ~
.!1 g;-atiae ~ SJ!a'"Tl'6ero aroltrlo." oK. It. vpera Omnl.9. 2. Aq-

9

are likened to instruments; the one being used for reasoning,
the other, for willing.

In both eases a distinction ie made be-

tween the power and. its act t the instrument and 1 ts use.

In the

will there is also distinguished the affections tor happiness
and rightness. forces and inclinations by which the '1il1 spon-

taneously moves itself and in turn moves the other powers involved in tree. volunta.ry aots.
A man has both sensual and oogn.itional knowledge or the
world. 14 He i3 affected by particular corporeal objects in the

world around. him.

From the rea.ction of his rive sense organs to

the impulses trom the sensible object an interior oorporeal image

is tormed in the body.

Purthermore a spiritual image or word 1.

tormed in the intellect, tor "to think

prese it mentally."15

or

an object ••• is to ex-

The one is not the other.

The phantasm

is restricted to a particular sensible object: whereas the intellectual iaage grasps the universal.
\-Jay •••

--

"I express a man in one

through the image ot his body, when the mind ima.gines his

visible torm; through the reason, however, when it thinks ot his
universal essence, whioh is rational, mortal anlmal.,,16

Whereas

the mind may miSinterpret the reports at the senses, the senses
881m1, 00. J'rancis f'-,obmitt, 0.3.:8. (6 vola.; Vol. I; Sekau: AbbE!'

Piess, 1939; Vola. II-VI; Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 19l46-61). II,
p. 279, 11. 4-6. All Latin quotations are trom this edition.

1~onolog1on, ch. 1, p. 38.

l5 Ibid., ch. 48, p. 112.
16Ib~4.' ch. 10, p. 57.
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always report correctly.

A

mistake in the process of sensation

is "not the fault of the senses, which report what thoy are able
to, (since they were given just this potency), but it must be
imput.d to the judgment ot the mind, which does not distinguish
clea.r1,. what they can or what they ought to do.,,17

Moreover,

knowledge ot the world is gained only through the medium of the
senses and phanta.sm: lithe artisan is wholly unable to conceiva
in his imagination any bodily thing, except what be has in 80ae
way learned trom external objects, whether all at once, or by
part. n18

Besides knowing the world, a man can reflect upon and

know himself.

Just as a person can passively know many things

without actually thinking about them, so too does he have an
awareness, a consciousness ot him.e1f, even though he may not
actually have his soul as an object of reflection.

"The human

mind is not always thinking ot itself, thougb it ever remembers
itselr.»19 !his •••ory ot itself, moreover, is the condition
for the reflexive act; tor 'fit is clear that, when it thinks ot

itselt, the word oorresponding to it is born of memory.»20
reflecting upon itself the soul forms within itself an image

itself by speaking itself as an interior word.
b

I

••

F

*---.,...

l7~ !!rl~~~!, ch. 6, McKeon, ~. g!!., p. 162.

-

19Ib1d ., ch. 48, p. 112.
2OIbid •
I

or

Between this word

...,.

l~ono~2S1oq, ch. 11, p. 58.

In

11

and the soul only a rational distinction exists.

"The rational

mind, then, when it conceives of itself in thought, has with
itself its image born of itself' ••• altbough it can.Dot, except in

thought alone, separate itself trom its image, which is its

word.,,2l
A third source of knowledge is the light of truth, which
illumines aankil.ld and "trom. which shines every truth that gives
light to the rational mind."22

The light is far too bright for

Anstillll to see and yet he sees nothing except through it just "as
tho weak eye aees what it see. through the ligbt ot the sun,
which 1n the sun itself it cannot look upon.,,23
dor ot the Lord
and has

hi~

~hich

being.

It is the splen-

is wholly present, in which Anselm moves

This much Anselm says, but just

ex~ctly

what

Do.at de Varges, tor instance, maintains

he means is ambiguous.

that the light of truth 1s the agent intellect;24 whereas Flsch.~

believes that it i6 a metaphorical expression tor the first principles in so tar as they are grasped as reflections of the divine
light. 25
Now that the sources of human knowledge have been considored, the investigation into truth may be continued.
•

T.

F

21Ibld., ch. 33. p.

. . . . . ._

Truth 1s
It

_

• • _------..

97.

22 Proalosion, ah. 14, p. 21.

23Ibld •• ah. 16, p. 22.
24Domet de Vorges, Saint 4nse11.l1e (PariS: Felix Aloun,
19(1), p. 106.
25Ft.oher, If Die Erkenntnls1ehre Anselma Von Canterb!!fi' It
Beitraege zur a..ohIent' aer PhilosopHie des Mi~lil~era,
,3;

AU.nster i:-V: Iscnen!orf?iChe

Verlag8DuoEiin!IUigt~91r), p. 48.
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also predicated ot the essences ot things.

Wherein does the

truth ot essences 11e1

In the conformity ot what they ought to

be with what they are.

God is truth; there is nothiT'g, be it in

any place at any time, that is not related to this highest truth
nor that 1s able to be anything else than what 1t is.

"~thatAo

ever 1s, therefore, is truly, in so far as it is what it is 1n
the supreme truth. w26 Essences are true because they correspond
to the divine idea of what they should be.

Anselm .eems ·to indi-

cate that truth 1s had onll in the oontext ot real existence.

AccordlD.8 to hill, "that which is falsely 1s not. tt27

Since what-

is exists in aocorda,'lce to the .11 vine mind, it 18 as it should

be.

Being as it should be, it rightly is what it is.

It fol-

lows, then, that trutb and rightness are in the essence of
things; "it 1s certain, that the truth of things is righ-tness. tt28
From his investigation ot where truth is said to be found,
Anselm concludes that truth or rightness is primarily the supreme
Truth.

All other truths are true in Virtu. of the supreme Truth.

They are what they ought to be or do what they ought to do becUllse th8y are

OI'

act in accordance with divine Truth.

not tho case for diville Itruth.
it 1s.

Such is

It is what it is solely because

It is completely independent, dependent upon nothing.

Exclusive ot the diviDe fruth, some truths are causes:

26R! Veritate, en. 7, p. 163.
27Ib1d •
28Ibi~ •• p. 164.

13
others, both effects and causes: ettects in that they are caused
by God, the cause of all truth; causes in that they in turn cause

the truth of thoughts and statements.

"T.be truth which is in

the existence ot things ••• is also cause itselt of the

tr~th

wh1cb

is thought and that which 1s in a propOSition; and these two
latter are the cause of no truth."29

Anselm has shown the rightness ot statements, thoughts,
actions, essences, and sensation.

The only rightness not as yet

considered is the rightness of corporeal things, such as the
rightness or straightness of a pole.

The common notion in the

truth ot statements, thoughts, actions, essences, sensation, and
corporeal things, is rightness.

ing their rightness?
so forth are

Is there any way ot distinguish-

The former rightnesses of statements and

conceive~ by

the mind alone; whereas the latter (the

rightness ot corporeal things) is perceived by both the senses
and the mind.

Truth, in the strict sense, Anselm limits to the

tormer, defining it as "rightness perceptible to the mind
alon8."'O
!ruth has three characteristics; it 1s eternal, unchangeable, and one.

Upon the first characteristic a proof tor the

existence of God can be based. 31
contradictory notion.

That truth is not eternal is a

If someone were to say there was a time

29~.t p. 170.
30Ibid ., ch. 11, p. 172.
31Alexandre Koyre, L·Id~. de Dleu dans 1& Phi1~soph1e ~
St. Anselme (Paris: Ernst teroux,-r9~ p. 9J.

-

14

when there was no truth or that there will be a time when there
will bft no truth, he would have to affirm the statement that

truth is not eterna.l.

But then, this statement would be true

even when truth 1s not supposed to exist or have existed.
contradiotion is obvious.

The

Since men make true statements, truth

is eternal; since God is the source ot truth, He must exist and
eternally exist. 32
Since truth is eternal, it must also be unchangeable.
8o~ething

is true, when it is right or has rightness.

the rightness varies or it does l:ot vary.

Either

It it varies, it

varies according to the things themselves.

One proper example

is adequate tor elucidating all instances.

A statement is right

when it says what it ought to say; namely, that what is is and
what is not is not.
be right.

Without this rightness, a statement oannot

If rightness were dependent upon the statement, right-

ness would vary as statements vary; and when a state.ment is

false or not made, rightness would not exist.

But, when a state-

mont is talse, it is no less right that the statement should have
expressed what it ought to have expresaed.

Rightness is the nOrD

according to which a statement is true or talse.

When a state-

ment is not made, it is no leAS true that, it it were made, it
should be made rightly.

Therefore rightness eXists, even though

the statement does not exist.

Even atter a statement is made,

the rightness by which it was right or should have been right

32R! Veritate, ch. 10, p. 170.

1;
does not perish.

"The rightness ther':3'tore by which signification

in called right does not acquire being, or a.n:J' change, through
alg.nlticatioD, however the signification itself may be change~~3
Since truth is botlI eternal and unchangeable , it 1s invariable, it is one.

That Anaelul has considered the truth in state-

monts. thoughts, essences, and so forth, allot which are difterent trom one another is no objection to the unity ot truth; for
truth is improperly said to be ot this or that thing,
since truth does not have its being in things, or out
of' things, or 'because ot things in which it is said to
be, but when things are according to that which 1s always
present in those things which are as they should be, then
the truth ot this or that thin! is spoken ot ••• the supreme
truth subsisting in itself 1s the truth ot no thing, but
when something 1s according to truth, then it is called
the truth o.r the rightness of that thIng. ~
God is supreme Truth.

Truth is one, immutable, eternal, and per-

ceptible to the mind alone.
which it is predicatGd.

It is independent altha things ot

These same ideas run through the proofs

tor the existence of God in the Monologion.

All tour~5 ot the Mono1ogion prooto go trom the sensible
world to the first cause or exemplar of the world.

Men experi-

ence good things in this world with both their bodily senses and
intellectual faculties.

The question arises as to whether these

desired goods a.re good through one thing or several thint}s.

All

-

3}Ibid., ch. 13. p. 182.

34-Ibid •• pp. 183-84.
35Th• number or arguments is disputed. The common count
is tour; e.g •• P. V1gnaux. "Sens et Structure du Monologion,lf
Revue des Sciences PhilosoEhIgues-et !5eolosIgUis, Xf!I, p. 199.
!oyre idle an argument from beauE7;-SR. 2!!., p. 37.
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goods can be compared with one another.

In oomparison, the good.

are either equal or unequal, either they are good in the same
measure o.r else

80me

are better or less good than the others.

But the oomparison, to be valid, can depend upon only one criterion or standard for allot the compared goods.

The standard can-

not be different in one thing a.nd ill another.

One may not decide

one man 1s more just tha.n another, Uexcept through the quality
of .i»stness. whioh is not one thing in one substanoe. and another
in

another.,,36

80me

Though justioe is a quality predicated of onlT

beings, goodness 1& not; it can be predicated in greater or

lesser degree of

.ve~hing.

In each case, the criterion must

be the same, ulthougb. sowetimes a thing appears to be good for
different reasons.

~AUS

a horse may be termed good, beoause it

is swift and strong, neither of which qualities seems
flue.

~o

be the

But swiftness a.ud strength cannot be the basis of good-

ness, because these same

qua.lit1~.Hi

w.". said to make a. thief bad.

!rhe qual1ties themselves are good, bow they are el£.ployed accounts

for their being called sood or bad in different oircumstances.

In general. things are called good because they arb either useful
or have some noble quality.

Whatever is usetul or noble, howevez

if it be truly good, is good through that bemg "through which

it 1s necessary that everything, whatever
be, is.,. . . . . .gOOd_,,37
______________________
11_._.it
______may
._.___
. .",. . . . . . . . . . . ., ....

3~nolos1o~. ch. 1. p. 39.
37Authorts translation. On account ot the context he in-

terprets l/(per idipaum esse bona) per quod neoesse est esse OUlleta bona, qu1dquid ll1ud sit." Monol~s1o!!, ch. 1, Schmitt, I, p.
15, 11. 2-" ditferently from Diane's translation: "tbrough
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Since it is tho basis upon ,.,.hioh evm:-,.thlng i8 termed good, this

being cannot but be the

gl~ateRt

good.

Moreover, aUlee the les-

ser goO<.is do not have goodness ot thAm8&1 vea (otherwise goodne ••

\fould be one thins in onf't being and I'someth;ing els8 in another) t
t~hey

must receive or l'mrtake- in the common source ot goodness,

uhioh is the one, the supreme good, which alone 1s good through
itself.

Surpassing all other

and great.

Nothing surpasses

be1n~
no~

it is both supremely good

equals it in goodness or £reat-

ness, not physical greatness but that depending upon worthiness,
11ke wisdom.

Supreme goodness and sreatness imply each other.

"And since there oan be nothing supremAly great Axcept wha.t is
£3upremely good, there JIlUst be

B

being that in greatest and best.

i.e., th. highest of all be1ngs."38

ADs_1m has argued from goodntHUJ and greatness in beings
to one greatest and baet being.

existence

an~

Be continues by arguing trom

degree8 or dignity in beings.

Whatever eXists,

exists through itselt or -through another or through mutual causal

1ntlu4nce.

It is Dot 10g1cal to imagine that a being exists

through the very being upon which it confers existence; so this

alto:t"1lat1ve ilt eliminated.

More than one thing cannot exist

tbrough itself .. beoause it they were to exist through themselves,
they would be equal :In this respect.

:aut to be eqUAl 1t 1s nee•• 10

BarT that there be one power or nature

or

existing "througb it-

which all goods exist, whatever that being 1s," p. 40.
Xoyre, sm., c.:~~., p. 39.

~onolosion, ch. 1, p. 40.

Cf.
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se1t" by which the7 exist.

There can be, then. but one being

who exists through itself and through which all other existents
oxist. "one being which alone exists in the greatest an1 higbest
degree of 811."39
Furthermore, there are in tbeworld natures of dIverse
A horae is better thall a log and a man better than a

dignity.

horse.

But the ladder cannot rise forever,

bisheat nature or ODe highest olass.
are equal.

80

there must be one

It they form a class, the7

It they are equal. th&y are so through one cause

which is either themselves or something else.

If it is something

else. it is something at a superior nature; hence, they oould Dot

form a highest class.

If it is themselves, it is their esaence.

But, then, they oan have oAly one essence and one natul'iI t nature
aod 8£S8»oe being identified here.

Anselm's resounding conclu-

sion to theae arguments 1s that there is:

a certain Nature, or Substanoe, or Essence, whioh is
through i teel r good and great and through i taelf' is what
it is; and through which exists whatever 1s 'truly good,
or great, or has any existence at all; and which is the
supreme good being, the supreme great being, being or
subsisting a8 supreme, that is, the highest or all 8xist1ns beings. 40
Just as all things which exitit exist through the supreme

Being, so too do they exist trom it; because the two modes ot
expression may be interchanged now with the same meaning, now

with another.

!he question remains how the supreme Being exists

39~.t ch. " p. 42.
401914 ., ch. 4, p. 45.
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thrOugh itself, aince tbe expression "esse per" usuall,. suggests
an efficient, material, or instrumental cause.

Can the supreme

Being be any of these causes in regard to its existence?

Cer-

tainly not, because these causes are prior to the effect. are
greater in 80m. sense than the effect, and rule out independence.
Nor can the supreme Being exist through or from. nothing.

Exis-

tence through and from itself can be compared to a lighted light.
The mutual relations ot the light and the verb lito light" and the
partiCiple "luoent" are like the relations of essence, esse, and
bein8. 41
Jaeumker42 and J18chor43 maintain that the above proofs
exclude causality; whereas Adlhoch44 holds that they are causal

arguments and Dollot de Vors••45 coapares them to th.e causal
proofs in St. Tho.as.

!he issue bere is whether or not Anselm

i8 .erely dealing with concepts.

It appears that, siDee he de-

velops his notion of God from things in the world and concludes
to an unca.used cause. the second opinion is the stronger.
After establishing that the Supreme Being exists through

----------.----------_.--------------------------------.-----------41~i~., ab. 6, p. 49_
42C1 •••Ds Baeumker, "Witalo, Bin Phi1oso2b und NaturtorJahrhunderts, If BaitI'me aux' ~.cbI01ite aer Ph1loaoph1e-!ea
tt.li1ters (tIl, 2, Hueniter-r. w.: lschendortlea lien verrags5ucfil1an<tlun~h 1908). p. 295.
scher deS

IIAI.

4;gischer, ii- git., p. 37.

"B.

Adinocn, "Del' Gotte.bewe1s des hei1igen Ansel.,"
(X.4, 1897), p. 270 t.

~1loso2hiscbe~ ~~r~~ch

4'nomet de Vorges, ~. ~•• pp. 233-38.
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itself and all other things exist through it, Anselm investigate8
its properties.

He proceeds by eliminating whatever it is better

not to be than to be.

First of all, no relative exprftssion sig-

nifies God's essenoe.

To aay that Be 18 the highest of all be-

inss, or greater than those which have bean created
to give an essential description of God.

by

If no othar beings ex-

isted with which He cou.ld be compared, IIe oould not be

to a8 "greater than" or "the highest."

Him is not

re!'erl'~d

Since lie 1& wbat fie is

througb HaBel! and other things ue what they

&1"'&

through

!Ia.

lie is actually no less great even thougb there are no other creatures witb which He may be coapared.

~~'heth• .r!Ie

is termed "su-

premo" or not makes no dift&rence; theref'ore, the L.ame is not
ea~ent1al

to llis description.

filis same reasoning applies to

all similar relative exprossions.

By themselves, they cannot

describe God.
!he non-relative expressions

aI'&

conveniently divided in-

to those things, which, considered separately, it is

b6tt~r

to be

than not to be t an;l thooe wbich it is not better to be tban to

be.

In general, to be something is better than not be be

60m6-

thing; bu.t th,n'e are some perfections which are good in 80me e1rCum8t~lC.8

and bad in others.

To be gold, for example, in bette!

than to be lead; to be an anilA&l 1s better tbaL. to be a plant or

a stone. to be a man is better tban to be merel¥ an animal.

for

a piece of lead to be turned into gold could well b. a 8004; but

tor a man to be turned into lold like King ltidas would oertainl,.
be a catastrophe

or

the first rank.

Such p$rtections, then,
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since they depend upon special circumstances tor being good, cannot apply directly to God's essence.
Other perrections are good without qualification.

Wher-

ever they are, they are good; wherever they are absent, some pertection is missing.
tne.

To

Wisdom and justness are two examples ot this

be wise is always better than not to be wise, to be

just i8 alwa,'s better than not to be just.
truth, blessedness, power, and eternity.
should be attributed directly to God.

Other example. are
These names can be and

"Bence, the Being must be

living, wise, powerful, and all-powerful, true, just, blessed,
eternal, and whatever, in like manner, is absolutel,. better than
what is not it. u46
Even these terms .eem to have relative aspects.

.or in-

stanc., to say that God is true or just se.ms to imply quantity
or quality, that is, accidents which are distinct trom His essence; because so.ething can be true and just only through truth
and justness.

The participant i8 what 1 t i8 through another, the

partioipated.

The partiCipated i8 not the partiCipant; the par-

But this distinction oannot

ticipant is not the participated.
apply to God.

As was proTed abov., the supre•• Being can be

through nothing else than Blmselt.

!he only possible conclusion

i8 that, in reterenoe to God, absolute pertectlons, no matter
whether they are predicated as adjeotives or nouns, mean the s ...
thins.

Be is true, Be 1s truth;

ae

~onOloSion, cb. 15, p. 64.

i8 just, He is justioe.
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uNotb1ng that 1£1 truly said ot the supreme Being is accepted in

terms ot quality or quant1ty, but only in terms ot what it 18._ 47
Although many names are applied to tbe supreme Being, and
designate His essence, ae is not composed ot many, d1tterent
tbin;;s.

In Him there can be no composition.

otherwise lie would

depend upon sometbing outside of Himselt as an etficient and/or
mater1al cause.

But, as was proved aboTe, He exists through Him-

selt, depending upon nothing else tor His existence.

God is a

single, simple being described by means ot a pluralit7

or names.

Just as the divine simplicity excludes all composition,
so too does it exclude any accidents, properly so-called.

B.y

definition, an accident 1s something which comes and goes trom a
being, causing some change in it.

The divine being, however,

does not undergo change in a.ny torm.

It is eternal, immutable.

If it were not eternal, it would have a beginning and/or an end.
It it had a beginning, it would derive its existence trom
or trom nothing.

anoth.~

Since nothing can come trom nothing, it could

not have had a beginning trom nothing.

Since it would be a con-

tradiction to maintain that the supreme BeIng exists through anything but ltselt, it could not have bad a beginning trom so••thing else.

It it had an end, it would be corruptibl., able to

be broken into parts.

Since it is simple, it cannot be broken

into parts; and bence, it has no ending.

or

FUrthermore, on account
its simplicity, it cannot be the material cause ot anytbing. 48
47Ibid., ch. 17, p. 67.
48Ibid., cb. 7. p. 51.
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and it alone exists through itself, all other things exist

~t

it by creation and conservation.

~hrough

anything is, there and then it is.

~henever

Besides being every-

at every time, it goes be70nd the dimensions of space and

~here

~ime, "for place
~ed

Therefore. wherever and

and

time themselves are existing thingS,H49 crea-

by it; so that it is unlimited and eternal.
The names "lite" a.nd "eternal" are of special interest

~he

:tOl

topic of this paper, because both life and eternity imply tor

~nselm

necessary existence.

The eternal being has no beginning,

nor end, nor time, whether it be past, present, or future, con~idered

~easee

as the transient time of men.

the fullness of life.

~erminates
~xist

it.

The

bein~

who is life pos-

No cause either brings it about or

The supreme Being is said to be eternal or to

torever and "since for it, it is the same to exist and to

4iV8, no better sense can be attached to this statement, than
that it exists or lives eternally, that is, it possesses intermin!ble life, as a perfect whole at once.,,50
Moreover, when be inquires into whether God can be oalled
!

substance, Anselm maintains that the term suits God in a quali-

ried way.
~oing

An ordinary substance 1s affected by accidents, under-

changes for which composition of substance and accidents is

49 Ibid., ch. 20, p. 73.
50Ibid., ch. 24, p. 83.

The Latin text reads: "Quonlam
dem est irrr-esse et vivere, nihil melius intel11gitur quamaeterne esse vel vivere, id est interminabilem vitam perfecta simul
~otam obtinere," Schmitt, I, p. 42, 11. 18-20.
Compare with Boe~hius' definition of eternity in De Consolatione Philosophiae, V,
~
p.:
1. 63, 858 A.

n.

--
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~equired.

God is both simple and immutable.

The only way the

can apply is if substance is used for being and so traospands all substances. 5l When distinguishing between God and

~erm

~verything

~ence

that is not God, Anselm uses absolute, perfect exis-

over against highly imperfect existence.

God and God alone

simply, perfectly, and absolutely; all other things are as
pon-existent in comparison with Him.52 That which exists simply

~xists

~d

in the highest degree of all seems to have, and can have, no

pther existence than necessary existence.
When all the names are put together, God is described as:
supreme Being, supreme Justness, supreme Wisdom, supreme
Truth, supreme Goodness, supreme Greatness, supreme Beauty, supreme Immortality, supreme Incorruptibility, supreme
Immutability, supreme Blessedness, supreme Eternity, supreme Power, supreme Unity; which is nothing else than
supremely being, supremely living, etc. 53
51 The Latin text reads: "nisi dicatur substantia pro eseentia. et sic sit extra. sicut est supra omnern aubstantiam,tI
Schmitt, Monologion, ch. 36, I, ~. 44, 11. 10-11. Deane translates essentia as "being~ (p. 86), and not without reason; for in
earlier passages Anselm equates existens with subsistens and es~entia with esse and. ens.
ttQuemadiiodum. enim esse habent ad iiiviaem lux et lucere et lucens, sic sunt ad se invicem essentia at
ease et ens, hoc est existens siva subsistens.Ergo sumroa eS3entia et summa esse at summa ens, id est summa exist ens sive summe
Bubsistena,!1 Monologion, ch. 6, Schmitt, I., p. 20, 11. 15-18.
~Quonlam tamen ipsa non solum eertissime exist1t, sed etiam summe
pmnium existit. et euius1ibet rei essentia diei eolat substantia:
~rotecto si quid digne diei poteat, non prohibetur dic1 substan~1a," Monologion, ch. 28, Schmitt, I, :t>. 45, 11. 13-15.

52MonoloSion, ch. 26, p. 86.

53The Latin text is more inclusive, reading: "Summa essen..
summa Vita, summa ratiO, summa iustltla ••• summe ens, summe
~lve!ls, at alia similiter," Monolosion, ch. 16, Schmitt, I, p. 31,
~1. 4-8; Deane, p. 66.
~la,
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All of theae names are contained in the simple formula "a being
a f.;reater than which cannot be thought. tt

But evgn more is im-

plied in itt because whatever' men use to name God t they use improperly.

Men have only analogical knowledge of God.

are derived from experience of the tinite world.

The names

Hence. both

creatures and God share the same name; yet, in the case of God
the name has a very different Signification. 54

God transcends

men's knowledge just as He transcends all substances.

God, An-

selm realizes, is actually in this sense, "a being 8reater than
cnn be conceived ... 55

.------...

.. ,.- ,.. ..
54F1qno1031on, ab. 26, p. 86.
-~

...

55 Pr
.
ah. 15.
;;. os 1 O?l:l.OD,

p. 22.

.
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CHAPTER II
THE ANaELMIAN AHGUM.b:NT AND THE OO.NTROVERSY

BETWEEN GATJNILO AND ANSELM

The argument is found in the second and third chapters ot
the

Pr08logio~,

in which Anselm writes:

And 80 Lord. do thou, who dost give understanding to
faith, give me, so tar as thou know.st it to be profitable,
to understand that thou art as we believe; and that thou art
that which we believe. And, indeed, we believe that thou
art a being than which nothing greater can be oonceived.
Or is there no auoh nature, sinoe the tool hath said in his
heart, there 1s no God? (Psalm. xiv. I). But, at any rate,
this very tool, when he hears of this being ot whioh I speak-a being than whioh nothing greater can be conceived--understands what he hears, and wbat he understands i8 in his und.~·
atandlng, although he does not understand 1t to exist.
For, it is one thing tor an ob~ect to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists.
When a painter first conceive8 ot what he will atterward8
pertorm, he has it in his understanding, but he does not 7et
understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it.
But atter he bas made the painting, he both bas it in his
understanding, and be understands that it exists, because
he has made it. 1

,ft.

lDee.,
cit., p. 7. !he Latin text reads: "Ergo,
domine, qui das
eiutellectwa, da mihi, ut quantum soi. expidire 1ntellig~ quia es sieut oredimus, et hoc as quod oredl.us.
i t quidem eredimus te esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogi»ari
posslt. An ergo non est aliqua talls natura, quia 'dixit in.ipiens in oorde suo: non est deus'? Sed oerte lpse idem insiplens,
CWI audit hoc ipsum quod dico: 'aliquid quo maius nihil cogltari
potest', intalligit quod audit; et quod intelligit in intelleotu
8ius est, etlas 8i non intelllgat illud esse. Ali~ enia est
r8lD e8se in intellectu, aliud inteillsere rem esse. Bam CUll plctor praecogitat quae tacturus est, habet quid em in intel1ectu,
.ed nondum intelligit esse quod Bondwa tecit. Cum vero lam pinxIt, et habet in tntellectu at intelllg!t esse quod lam fecit."
Vol. I, p. 101, 11. 3-13.
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aence, even the tool is convinced that something exists
in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater
can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater
can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone.
For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it
can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.
Therefore, it that, than which nothing greater can be
conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being,
than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than
which a greater can be conceived. But obY1ously this is
impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a
being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it
exists both in the understanding and in reality.
CTrlAPTER III

And it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive ot a
being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is
greater than one which can be oonceived not to exist. Hence,
it that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be
conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing
greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable
contradiction. There is, then, so trul~ a being than which
nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot
even be conoelved not to exist; and this being thou art, 0
Lord, Our God. 2

2Ibid ., pp. 8-9. !'he Latin text reads: "Convincitur ergo etiam Inslpiens eSS8 vel in intellectu aliquid quo nihil maiul
cogitari potest, quia hoc cum audit intellig1t, et qu1dqui4 1ntelligitur in intellectu est. i t carte 1d quo maius cogitar1 nequit, non poteat coglta.r1 e8se in solo 1ntelleotu. 8i .nim vel
in solo 1ntellectu est, poteat cogitar1 8sse et 1n ret quod maiue est. 8i ergo 14 quo malus cogltarl non poteat, est in solo
intellecVuI id ipSUB quo maius oogitari non potest, est quo maius oogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse Don potest. Exist1t ergo procul dubio allquld quo maius cogltarl non valet, at in intellectu et in re.
Quod utique sic vere eat, ut nee cogltarl poasit non esse. Bam poteat cogitarl ess. aliquid, quod non possit cogitari
non esae; quod maius est quam quod non es.e aogitari potest.
Quare ai id quo maiu8 nequit cogitari, poteat aogitari non esse.
1d ipsuz quo maius cogitari nequit, non est id quo maius cogitarj
nequit; quod convenire non potest. Sic ergo vere est aliquid
quo maius oogitari non potest, ut nec cog1tar1 possit non e.se.
Et hoc 88 tu, domine deus noster." ibid., 1. 13- p. 103.
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So truly, therefore, dost thou exist, 0 Lord, my God,
that thou canst not be conceived not to exist; and rightly.
For, it a mind could conceive ot a being better than thee,
the creature would rise above the Creator; Elnd this is most
absurd. And, indeed, whatever else there 1s, except thee
alone, can be conceived not to exist. To thee alone, theretore, 1t belongs to exist more truly than all other beings,
and hence in a h1gher degree than all others. For, whatever else exists does not exist so truly, and hence in a
less degree 1t belongs to 1t to exist. Why, then, has the
tool said in b.is heart, "there is no God" (Psalms xiv. I),
since it is so eVident. to a rational mind, that thou dost
exist in the highest degree of all? Wh7, exeept that he is
dull and a tool. ,
This is the general structure ot the argument.

Further embel-

lishment, commented upon by Anselm in his reply to Gaun11o, appears in chapter tour.
But how has the tool said in his heart what he could not
oonceive; or how i8 it that he could not conceive what he
said in his heart? Since it i8 the same to say in the
heart, and to conceive.
But, ir really, nay, since rea117, he both conceived,
because he said in his heart; and did not say in his heart
because he could not conceive; there is more than one waT
in which a thing is said in the heart or conceived. For,
in one sense. an object is conceived, when the word signitying it is conceived; and in another, when the very entity,
which the object is, is understood. 4
'Ib&d., p. 9. The Latin text read8: "Sic ergo vere es,
domine deus meus, ut nee oogitari possis non esse. Et merito.
8i enie a1iqua mens pas set cogitare aliquid .elius te, asoenderet
creatura super creatore., et iudicaret de creatore; quod valda
est absurdum. Et quidem quldquid est allud praeter te solum,
poteat cogitari non e.se. Sol us igitur verissia. omnium, at 1dee
maxime omnium babes ease; quia quldquid aliud eat non sic vere,
et idciroo minus habet esse. Our itaque 'd1x1t insip1ens in corde suo: non est deus', cum tam in promptu sit rationali menti
te maxima omnium esse? Our, nisi quia atultuB at inaipiene. If
~., 11. }-11.
pp. 9-10. !'he Latin text reads: "Verum quomodo
dixit in
• quod oogitare non potuit; aut quomodo cog1tare non
potuit quod dixit in corde. cum idea sit dicere in corde at 00g1tare? "IUod 81 vere, immo quia vere at cogitaY1t quia dixit in
corde, et non dixit in corde quia oos1tare non potu1t· non uno
f~f~ modo 41c1tur .11quid in corae vel cog1tatur." ib1d., 11.

4i3M.'
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In the termer sense, then , God can be aoncei ved not to
exist; but the latter, not at all. For no one who understands what fire and water are can conceive tire to be water,
in accordance with the nature e,f the facts themselves. although tbis 1s possible according to the words. So. then,
no one \'1'::10 understands \"h~t God is can conceive that God does
not exist; although he says th~se words in his heart, either
without any or with some fcreign signification. For, God is
that than which a greater cannot be conceived. And be who
thoroughly understands this, assuredly understands that this
being so truly exists, that not evan in concept can it be
non-existent. Therefore. he who understands that God so
exists, CBDnot conceive that be does not exist.
I thank thee, gracious Lord, I thank thee; because what
I formerly believed by thy bounty, I nov so understand b7
thine illumination, that it I were unwilling to believe that
thou d08t exist. I should not be able not to understand this
to be true. 5
!be Proslogiog was read by people within and without the
Abbey of Bee.

One of the outs1derB, Gat.ml1o t a monk of Mamou-

tier DOnI' Tours, lfrote a sbort reply to the Proslogion. in which
be lauded A.raelm tor the ardor and aplr1 tual

~Ieal

th of' his treat-

ment of the divine essenoe and chided him for using weak argumentation to prove or oonolude to God's existenoe.

As far as Ga.un-

ilo was concerned, the 801e method ot proving God's existence was

inference trom empirically given data in the world.

The other

Aliter enim cogitatur res cum vox eam significano cogltatur, aliter cum 14 ips~ quod res est 1ntelligitur. 1110 Itaque modo potest cogitari deus non esse, iato vero minime. Uullu5 qulppe intelligens i4 quod deus est, poteat oogitarEt quia deus non est. 1t
~.t 11. 18-21.
'Ibid., p. 10. !he Latin text reads: "licet haec verba
dioat in corde. aut sine ulls aut cum a11qua extranea significatione. Deus enim est id quo maiua oogitar1 non poteat. Quod qui
bene 1ntellig1t, utique 1ntelligit 1d ipsua 81c esse, ut ne cogitations queat non esse. Qui ergo inte.L11g1t sic esse deum, nequit eum non esse cogitare."
Gratias tibi, bone dOminai gratias tib1, quia quod prius
oredidi te dODAnte, 1am sic intel 1ao te 111uainantei ut 8i te ~o
lim credere, non poss1m non tntelllsera." Ibid., p. 04, 11. 1-1.
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tvo notions that formed the basis of his rebuttal were his unwillingness to equate the object ot the .formula "a being than l1hlch

nothing greater caD be thought" with God and his knowledge that
some people aotually deny God's existence.

He credits Anselm with making two po:i.nts: the first beins
that the divine natUl"0 1n in the intellect when the f'o:::-mula tfa
beint~

trvm which nothing i5reater can be thought" is mentioned and

understood; thtJ Heeond, that. the divine being also Axists in real·
ity or else it would not be

can be thought."

u

a being than which nothing greater

The second point follows from the first but

the .first 1s incorrect; so both are talse.

The divine nature cannot be in the intellect
tormula io

h~ard

and understood.

wh~n

the

It n man attempts to prove the

existence ot something in reality from a concept, this concept
must have a different status in bis mind trom a falae or doubttul concept or one ot something which is known not to exist.
But, in order to enJoy this superior status, the object of the
conoept must first be proved to exist in reality.

"I cannot con-

ceive, It Gaunilo writes, "of it in any othezo wq than by understanding it, that 1s, by comprehending 1n '11fT kno1<Jledge its exis-

tence in re·alit,.. ,.6

And if' this is the case. the order 1s

ohanged trom concept to rea11tj to ooncept from

rea11t~.

Sinee

the tormula as a conoept has the same value as the concepts ot
unrea.l objects, it ca.n be thought not to exist just as God can be
6 Deane ,

la J!lthaLf .2! !h!

11'001;., ah. 2, p. 146.
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thought not to exist.

God. indeed, can be thought not to exist,

tor it His non-existence were impossible to conceive "what was
the object at this argument against one who doubts or denies the
existence at such a being_"?
The analogy ot the painter who paints a picture does not
apply.

:rellowing Augustine, Gaunilo holds that the thought or

imagined picture which springs up in the painter's mind is a living part ot him.

file picture generated in bis art 1s nothing

other than a part ot his intellect which. in turn, is a part at
the painter.

All other truths which do not pertain to the nature

01 the intellect are perceived b,. thought or hearing.

'.ftle tormu-

la would be numbered among those truths not pertaining to the nature at the intellect.

Even granting that "a being a greater

than which can not be thought" is heard and understood, it would
still not have the same status as an interior Picture. 8
Moreover, upon hearing the formula, it is as impossible
to have actual knowledge ot the object ot the formula according
to either genua or species as it is to have actual knowledge ot
God.

It someone were to tell Gaun110 about a man whom Gaunllo

did not know, Gaunilo could imagine him as an actuall,. existing
being, even though he were a purely mental fiction that never
existed and never would exist.

He could conceive ot him as liv-

ing, because he knows by both genus and species what a man 1s.
?Ibid.
8 Ibid., ch. ,. p. 147.
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Since he can be deceived about things of which he has knowledge,
the possibility of deception greatly increases in regard to
things ot which he does not have such knowledge.

God and

"8

be-

ing than which nothing greater can be thought" are conceived "as
by a man who does not know the object, and conceives ot it only
in accordance with the movement of his mind produced by hearing

the word."9

Neither the concept ot God nor or Ita being than

which nothing greater can be thought" are already in the mind.
!he second pOint, namely, that existence in the intellect

ot fta being than which nothing greater can be thought" implies
its real existence or else it would not be greater than everything else, Gaunilo rejeots on the grounds that, since the idea
has the same status as any doubtful or talse notion bas in the
intellect, any actually existing being would be greater than it.

In order to show that this being 1s greater than aD7thing else
"it should be proved first that this being itself really exists
somewhere. MIO

Existence is proved on the basis ot an empiricall,

given existent.

otherwise, Gaunilo would have to admit that an

island having no owner or inhabitants and possessiDg the greateat
abundance ot riches exists merely beoause he understands what is
meant when he hears a description ot the perfeot island, a procedure he deems absurd. ll
9Ibid., p. 149 •
...........

..........
llIbid.,
..........

lOIbid., cb.

,.

p • 1~.

ch. 6, pp. 150-51 •
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The statement itsolf that a being which could be thought
not to exist is a lesser being than that which cannot be thought
not to exist Gaunilo maintains does not prove the actual existence of the object ot the formula.

The proper prooedure would

be to cogently prove the being's real existence and then compare
it with other beings to ascertain it it really is greater than

all others.
Instead of atating that the non-existence of the greatest
being cannot be thought, it would be better to state that the

posaibility of its non-existence is impossible to understand.
In this way the greatest being would be distinguished trom the
many thoughts in the human mind which do not and are known not to
conform to reality.

Gaunilo does not know if' he could think of

his own non-existence when he knows beyond doubt that he does
exist.

It makes no difference to his argumentation.

In either

case there 1s no reason tor thinking ot the necessary existence

ot the object of' the formula or or God.

For, if Gaunilo oan

think of his own non-existence while being absolutely certain he
exists, it tollows that he can think ot the non-existence ot anything else, including God whom he knows and believes to exist.
And. if he cannot, it follows that the impossibility of being
thought not to exist is by no means a property ot GOd. l2
Anselm begins his rebuttal with his strongest argument,
the one from faith.

Gaunilo has maintained that the formula is

in the mind in the same way as a concept whose exemplification
in reality is impossible or unthinkable and tha.t its mere pre-

sence in the intellect is no basis tor claiming that it i8
plitied in reality.

ex~m

From theae statements Anselm reasons that

either God is not "a being than which nothing greater can be
thought" or 81s. be is not understood and in the intellect.
both o£ the statements are talse.

But,

By faith and conscience all

Ohristians know that theI'. is a God and hence Re is in their un-

By taith and conscience they also know that He is

derstanding.

the Supreme Being and hence He is the being than which nothing
greater can be thought. l3
Atter arguing from faith, Anselm procedes to argue from
reason.

If Tla being a grea.ter than which cannot be thought" can

even be thought to exist it must eXist, "for that than which a
greater is inconceivable cannot be conceived except as without
beginning. n14

In order to £ultill the requirements of the torm-

ula, the being must be eternal and eternity implies necessary
existence.

Moreover, it must exist as a whole everywhere and

always; tor, i£ it did not, its non-existence at some time or
some place could be thought, which is contrar.r to the tormula.
Furthermore, suppose that the greatest being does not exist, even
though it can be conceived to exist, or that it cannot be conceived to exist eVen though it exists.

In both cases a contra-

13Deane , Ansel,m's Apologetic, ch. I, pp. 153-54.
14+bid •• p. 154.
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diction arises.
tor

"8

Neither alternative

the requirements
being a greater than whior. oa~ot be thcught. n15 Anselm
satis~ies

has just made statements about the greatest being, statements
which both he and Gaunilo understand not by faith alone but by
reason.

Sinoe they both understand what they are saying, "as-

suredly a being than whioh a greater cannot be oonceived exists,
and is in the understanding, at least to this extent--that these

statements regarding it are understood. nl6

To say that somethinS

is not in the intellect because it is not thoroughly understood
is as absurd as to say a man oannot see daylight because he cannot tace the pure, direot rays of the sun.

And it the tool doe8

not understand the formula when he hears it spoken in his own
language, he is either very stupid or else he has no mind at all.
What 1s understood 1s in the intellect just as what is thought
is in thought. l ?
Gaunilo's example of inferring the actual existence of
this island trom the faot that when it is described the description is understood is not to the point.

Anselm's argumentation

deals only with a being a greater than which cannot be thought.
Even the perfect island described has parts, but the being than
which a greater cannot be thought is simple.

Gaunilo suggests

that he can eas11y think of the non-existence of the perfect 18-

15Ib1d ., p. 155.
16Ibid.t
p. 156 •
.
l?Ibid.

land.

With this Anselm agrees.

the non-existence of the perfeot

He does not agree, however, that
b.in~ ca~

be thought; because

as soon as someone thinks the pertect being does not exIst, he
is thinking of something other than the par/oet be:ng.18
Whereas Gaunilo suggests it is better to state that the
possibility ot the perfect being's non-existence is impossible
to understand rather than to be thought or conceived, Anselm
maintains that the proper expression is impOSSibilIty to be
thought.

It is impossible to understand that a being which is

ltnown beyond the shadow ot a doubt to exist does not exist.

In

this sense God is not the only being whose non-existence cannot
be understood.

The

impo8.1bil~ty

however, 1s applied only to God.

at non-existence being thought •.
Men imagine many non-existent

things as existing and many existing things as non-existent.

A

distinction is to be made between thinking and understanding, because no existent can be understood as non-eXistent, while all
creatures. which have a beginning or an end or are composite, cam
be thought not to exist.

"That being alone, on the other hand,

cannot be conceived not to exist, in which any conception discovera neither beginning nor end nor oomposition of parts, and
which any conception linds a.lways and everywhere as a whole. nl9
Anselm agrees that some people deny God's existenoe.

Ho~

is this denial possible when God cannot even be conceived not to

18Ibid ., ch. 3. pp. 158-59.
19Ib1d •• eh. 4, p. 160.

exist?

~o

this quer,J Anselm answers that there is a d1fterence

between understanding a thing and thinking about the word which
signifies the thing.

"In one sense, an object is conceived, when

the word signifying it is conceived; and in another, when the
very entity, which the object is, 1s understood.

In the tormer

sense, then, God can be conceiVed not to exist; but in the lattaJ
not at al1."20

A person may say that tire 1& water so long as

he precinds tromthe actual meaning ot the words Utire" and
"water t• when he joins them 1nto thought.

But it he knows what

tire and water really are, he cannot truthfully join the words
into a meaningtul sentence.

Tbe same applies to God.

No one whe

really understands what God is can truly and meaningtully think
he does not exist.

It a person thoroughly understands what is

meant by the formula fta being than which a greater cannot be
thought, tt he "assuredly understands that this being so truly
exists, that not even in ooncept can it be non-existent. n2l

B7

thorough understanding Anselm does not mean an adequate or proper
ooncept ot God.

Like kunilo, he realize. that such an under-

standing is be70nd the power ot man.

In the introduction to the

Pro.logion he writes: "1 do not endeavor, 0 Lord, to penetrate

tb1' 8ubl1mi ty t for in no wise do I compare
that; but I long to understand in
my heart believes and 10ve•• "22

80me

my

degr•• thy truth, which

Ind.ed, God is more than a

2ODeane, Proslog10n, ch. 4, pp. 9-10.
21 Ibid ., p. 10.
22Ibid •• eh. 1, pp. 6-7.

understanding with

be1Dt

than which nothing greater can be thought.

He is a being greater

that which can be thought.

th~l

According to Anselm, part ot Gaunilots difficulty arose
trom a misconception.

Gauni10 wrote that tfwhat is greater than

all other beings is in the understanding; and if it is in the
understanding, it exists also in reality, for otherwise the beinS
whioh is greater than all would not be greater than &11.,,23

An-

selm, however, argued from the presence of a "being greater than
which cannot be gonceived. tt24 The two statements are not the
same.

It is easy to prove that & being than which a greater can-

not be conceived exists in reality, that its non-existence is impossible, and that the possibility of its non-existence is inconceivable.
exist.

Anything which does not exist is certainly able not to

But whatever can be thought not to exist, whether it ac-

tually exists or nott d08s not fulfill the hypothesis ot a beins
than which a greater cannot be conceived.
an absolutely pertect being that

80

A man can conceive ot

necessarily exists that it

~annot even be thought not to exIst. 25
On the other hand, the argument trom a being greater than
~ll

others does not readily exclude possible non-existence or mul·

tiplicity of greatest beings nor inc'lude identification with the
being than which nothing greater can be thought.

23Agselm's ARolosetic, ch. 5, p. 161.
24 Ibid ., p. 163.

25 Ibid ., pp. 162-163.
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prove God·s existence, Gaunilo's version "requires another premise than the predication, greater !h!a

!!! othG~ beiD5s,,,26

whereas in Anselm's version "there 18 no need ot any other than
this very predication,

~

beina than wh!oh

~

sreater cannot

~

conoeived.,,27
Gaunilo sued that the formula is understood in the same
manner that unreal objects are understood and are in the understanding.

This is all that Anselm was trying to establish.

nl10 strengthened his argument with the example
painting a picture.

or

Gau-

a painter

Before he paints the pioture, the painter

bas the image ot the painting in his mind.

Before the picture is

aotually painted, it is an unreal object.

Anselm shows that this

example is not to the point.

Anselm was trying to demonstrate

that "what is not understood to exist oan be 1n the un4erstanding,,,28 not that the notion ot a being than which nothing greater
can be thought is the same as the conoeptual image acoording to
whioh a painter paints.

If unreal beings oan be in the under-

standing when heard and understood, certainly the formula 1s s1mi·
larly understood when heard.

The next step 1s to discover whe-

ther the objeot ot the formula 1s solely in the understanding as
are unreal objects or whether it also exists in reallty.29
26Ibid.

t

p. 163.

27 Ibid •
28Ib1d ., ch. 8, p. 167.

29 Ib1d ., ob. 6, pp. 164-65.
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Gaunilo, moreover, claimed that he
formula when he heard it.

coul~:l

understand the

He also claimed that he could deny

Godts existence, because he did not understand God.
mula expresses an object and that object is God.

But the for-

Therefore. An-

selm cannot lathom how Gaunilo would be able to deny the existence of what be understands on the grounds that he does not understand it.

1'0 Anselm, this is a ridiculous contradiction.

"It

is incredible. I say, that any man denies the existence of this
being because he denies the existence ot God, the sensory perception of whom he in no wise conceives of.~}O
According to Anselm, it is obviously not true that Gaunilo 1s unable to understand the formula in terms ot any real object, genus, or species.

The notion of a belngthan which no-

thing greater can. be thought arises trom an analysis of the world
which 1s known in terms or genus, speCies, and actual individuals
Goods are compared, tor instance, in acoordance with the manner
in which they approach one another in goodnees.

That which is

less good is like that which is better, beoause it too is good,
although not in the same degree.

"It is therefore evident to anT

rational mind, that by ascending trom the lesser good to the
greater, we oan torm a considerable notion ot a being than which
a greater is inconceivable.,,;l

A. lesser good can begin to be and

cease to be, but it would be greater it it did not cease to be,
30Ibld., ch.
;lIbid.

? p. 166.
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and still greater if it Dever began to be nor will eYer cease to
be.

A good, then, a greater than which cannot be

have to be a necessarily existent, etemPil
formed trom the notion ot
greater can be thought.

actuall~

th~ught

The notioD is

b.ln~.

existing

will

objeet~

than which a

In this way, the fool who "denies that

a notion may be tormed trom other objecta of a being than which
a greater is inconceivable .. 32 oan be easi17 refuted; and the
Catholic should need no further proof than st. Paul's famous passage wherein he maintains the invisible things ot God can be seen
in his vestiges in creation."

Even if Gaunilo' s contention were true that thea.ing
than which Dothing greater can be thought could not be oonceived

or understood, it would still be true that this be1ngwould be
'both conceivable and. intelligible.

flIpgoI.lceivable is conce.lvable

although that to which the word lpconoeivable can be applied i$
not conceivable. n34 The formula would be both conceivable and
intelligible even though the being itselt to whioh it reters
were neither conceived nor understood.

An7 one who denies that

a being a greater than which cannot be thought exists muat conceive and Ullderstand his negative judpent.
cannot understand

O.L'

ftBut this denial ha

conceive ot without ita component terms; and

a term of this statement is

~2I214., p. 168.

~

belns than which

~

greater cannot

------_.-----.--._.----------_.-------

3~Roman~ I. 19-21.
344q$.l~~8 AR~logtitlq~ ah. 9, p. 168.
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~ conceived.""

This being Is concelved and understood and what

is conceived and understood is in the conoept and
Moreover, this being oannot be conceived ot and

l~~derstanding.

nnd~rstood

as

possibly not existing; tor than it would not be conceived ot and
understood tor what it Is, a being than wbich a granter cannot be
thought.

nWhen a being than which a greater is inconceivable i8

conoeived, it it is a being whose non-existenoe is possible that
i8 oonoeived; it is not a being thdn which a greater cannot be

According to the law ot non-contradiction, a paX'-

coneeived."3£,

son oannot think of two opposite thoughts at the same time.
tallows, then. that

It

It

what he conoeives of must exist; for anythil1t

whoae non-existenoe is possible, 1s not that of which be

COD-

Ioleive•• rt '7

with this refutation Anselm believed that he had shown
what he had previously proved in the opening of the Proslos;ion
thad reall,. been proved, D.WDely, that the being of the formula "is
~f

neoessity. trom the very tact that it is understood and con-

~eived.

proved also to exist in reality, and to be whatever we

_hould believe of the divine Bubstance."38

"Jbld. t p. 169.
Ibid •

,6

"

,

37Jbi:!.
38Ibid., ch. 10,

-

~.
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OHAPTER III
MALCOLM'S AND HARTSHORNE'S UNDERSTANDING
OF AU:3ELM· S

ARGUMENT

Malcolm indicates that lIin Anselm's Proslog1on and Respon
there are two different pieces or reasoning which
-hesiodideditoris
not distinguish from one another."1 but which should be
distinguished in order to shed light upon the problem of the ontological argument.

The first argument. an argument from contin-

gent existence, is in chapter two; the second, an argument trom
necessary existence, is in chapter three.

In the first argument,

Anselm states that a being is greater if it exists in both the
intellect and in reality than if it exists merely in the intellect.

From the wording ot the text in both Latin and English ver-

sions it is hard to decide whether Anselm also meant that existence in reality is by itself greater than existence in the mind
alone or that intentional existence is interior to real existence

At any rate. the implication in the argument is tha.t "if I conceive of something which does not exist then it is possible for
it to exist, and II l!lli. .2!. greater.!! II exists ~ !.! II does
not exist.,,2 Anselm. in other words, treats existence as a per-

-

1Noman Malcolm. "Anselm's OntoloSlca.l Arguments, It The
Philosophical Review, LXIX (January. 1960). p. 41.
2 Ibid., p. 43.
43
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tection, as a real predicate.
Immanuel Kant claimed to have
existence being a real predicate in

demolish~d

~

Critique

this notion ot

£i

~

Reason.

According to Kant, no !natter how many predicates are attached to
a subject, even it it be completely determined, nothing is added

to it by attributing existence to it.

It that were the case, the

exact objects ot concepts would not exist.

Malcolm agrees with

Kant, maintaining that Anselm'sf1rst argument is invalid on account of its basis in nth! talse doctrine that existence is a per.
tection.",3

Existence is rather that by which perfection is pos-

sible.
The argument in chapter three is different in that it

rests upon the notion that necessary existence is a property rather than that mere existence is a property.

Whereas the first

argument stresses contingent existenoe over nonexistence, the
second aQpbasizes neoessary existence over non-necessary or contingent existence.

Malcolm points out that Anselm says two

things in the second argument: "
first, that a being whose non-existence is logically impossible 1s -greater" than a being whose nonexistence is logically possible (and theretore that a being a greater than
which cannot be conceived must be one whose nonexistence
is logically impossible); second. that ~ is a being than
which a greater cannot be conceived. 4
There is a common meaning for the

illOrd

"God tI according to

which the statement: "God is a being a greater than which cannot

3Ibid., p. 44.
4

Ibid., p. 45.
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be conceived" is a logically necessary truth.

Anselm's use ot

the word "greater'· in this formula is puzzling enough to require
some explanation.
what is

com~only

Malcolm amplifies the meaning by explaining
meant by the notion ot superior and inferior,

dependent and independent, limited and unlimited, all of which
are interconnected. 5 With this expla.nation be supports his notion of God.
In ordinary language the words "superior" and "inferior"
ma.y reter to quantities.

For instance, Joey Brown's knowledge

ot algebra 1s designated as superior to Billy Black' S t i.! Joey
knows more algebra than Billy.

God is also said to be superior

because He bas more knowledge, to mention only one perfection,
than any other being.
Moreover, the \ford "dependent" is used to signify a causal relationship.

A house, for instance, depends upon an archi-

tect and builders for its constitution and upon a whole series ot
causes such aa painting and repair work and upon conditions such
as no serious storm or tire for its preservation.

The house do ••

not exist by itself either initially or consequently.
pendent.

It is de-

God, on the other band, as one reads in common prayers

and the Nicene Creed does not depend upon others tor his existence or continued existence.
made nor the made-maker.

He 1s the Supreme Maker not the

Independence is one ot the notable

characteristics ,\ih1ch distinguish Him trom other beings.

"To
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conceive of anything as dependent upon something else for its
existence 1s to conceive of it as a lesser being than God.,,6
The notions of dependence and interiority and of independence and
superiority are linked.

If something depends upon something else

it is said to be inferior to another something which, in all
other respects is the same, does not.
Closely allied to the notion of dependence is that of
limitedness.

An

engine that would not require .fuel would be said

to be superior to one that is limited by or dependent upon a fuel
supply for effective service.

The only belng that is not common-

ly conceived of as limited is God.
solutely unlimited being.
existenoe or his operation.

He is conceived ot as an ab-

No limits are placed upon either his
Nothing makes Him dependent.

No-

thing, not even Himself. prevents or could prevent Him trom existing or operating without bound.
This unlimitedness also excludes any chance or contingent
existence in God.

If it were possible that God could not-exist

and should bappen to eXist, He would not be the eternal being
that He is commonly conceived to be; because, if He could notexist and does exist, it would be possible that He could go out

ot existence just as Be came into existence.

This implies dura-

tion, a notion which is so alien to that of eternity.

Duration

implies a beginning, a continuing, and an ending; hence, a cause
tor each.

None of these comport ·with the notion of eternity.

6 Ibid., p. 47.
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In short, contingency in regard to either existence or nonexistence has no application to God.
exis"t;ence.

God's existence is necessary

The only alternative is that His existence is logi-

cally impossible.

But an affirmation of the logical impossibil-

ity of God's existence is tantamount to maintaining there is

contradiction in Anselm's formula tor God. 7
the formula is not self-contradictory.

Q

Malcolm asaumes that

He cannot give a dem.on-

strable proof of its self-consistency nor does be believe that
one can be legitimately demanded. 8
Necessity in God extends to all of His properties.
a necessary being; everything in Him is necessary.

He 1s

His necessity

however, is not something one proves through empirical data or
test criteria.

That He necessarily exists, that He is necessar-

ily omnisCient, all-good, and omnipotent are requirements of our
a priori conception of Him.

"The a priori proposition 'God neces-

sarily exists' entails the proposition 'God exists,' if and only
if the latter also is understood as an a priori proposition: in
whioh ease the two propositions are equivalent. 1t9

For Malcolm.,

therein lies the validity of Anselm t s proo,f' for the existence ot
God.
Many philosophers, attesting that existence 1s not a propert7 ot God, claim to have destroyed this ontological argument.

7Ibid., p. 50.
S Ibid., p. 60.

9 Ibid •

t

p. 50.
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Certainly, contingently existing things do not have existence as
Ll

property, but this is not true ot a necessary being.

The onto-

logical interence is not a jump trom the abstract intentional order to the concrete realm of contingent existents.

"What Anselm

did was to give a demonstration that the proposition 'God necessar!ly exists' is entailed by the proposition 'God is a being a
greater than which cannot be conceived' (which is equivalent to
'God is an absolutely unlimited being·)."lO

The absolutely un-

limited being is the neoessary being.
According to modern logic all existential statements are
contingent and the nocessity in propositions is based upon the
manner 1n which words are used.
argues that the religious needs

One modern ori tic, J. N. Findlq

or

people require that God be the

supreme excellence manifested by such properties as omniSCience.
complete independence, superiority in rank as well as in degree,
and necesssr.y existence.

The contingency dogma of existential

propositions, on the other hand, shows that the religiously adequate ooncept ot God cannot be satisfied.
existence is impossible.

The Anselmisn

As n result, God's

ar~~ent

proves the exact

opposite ot what Anselm intended to prove. 11
Malcolm maintains that Findlay- and other!:! misuse aspects
o! their thought.

The logical law that necessity in proposition.

is based upon the manner in which words are used "oannot possibly
lOIbid.
liN. findlay, MOan God·s Existence Be Disproved?," Mind,
LVII (April, 1948), pp. 176-18,.
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have the implication that every existential proposition must be
cont1ngent."l2
ingful way

Both the Ohristians and the Jews speak in a mean-

ot the necessary existence ot God.

ments are not to be understood as h7pothet1ca1.

And their stateA statement like

"God is eternal" 1s not to be understood to Signify "it God exists then he is eternal," which would be the same as saying nit
is possible that God may not exist, therefore he a&7 not be eternal."

Eternity by definition excludes any contingency wbat.oever

Kant, Oaterus, and others oontradict themselves when they link
the a priori truth ot the proposition ot God's necessary existence with the possibility ot las nonexistence. l3

!he two con-

cepts in no "&7 mesh.
Malcola • s proot t then. i8 based upon the commonly accepted oonoept1on of God and the rejection of the law ot 10gio concerning the contingency ot all existential propositions.

In sum-

mary torm his proof ia:
It God t a being a greater than which oannot be conoeived, does not exist then He oannot co•• into existenoe.
POl' it He would .ith.r have b.en ~!USea 10 come into existenoe or haye happ.ned to oome in 0 exlstenoe, in either
oa.e He would be a l1aited beins, which by our oonception
ot Him He is not. Sinoe Be cannot come into existenoe, it
Be doe. not exist His existenoe is impossible. It H. do••
exist He cannot bave come into existenc •••• nor oan He cease
to exist, for nothing could oause Him to cease to exist nor
could it just happen that He ceased to exist. So if God
exists His existenoe 1s necessary. Thus God's existence
ia either impossible or necessary. It can be the torser
only it the concept of such a being is aelt-contradictor"

55.
13Ibid ., p. 57.

12Ibid ., p.

or in some way logically absurd. Assuming that this i8
not so, it tollows that He necessarily exists. 14
Hartshorne agrees with Malcolm that there are two arguments in Anselm's work, one from contingent existenoe and one
trom necessary existence, and he also rejects the law ot logic
ooncerning the contingency of all existential statements.

He

contends that:
the theory ot the modality ot existential judgments (their
unitorm contingency) upon which rejection at the argument
chiefly rests bas little to commend it, being supported
solely by an exceedingly loose torm ot analogy, ass1ml1atins to ordInary contingent judpents (those which nearly
all philosophers agree are such) two torms which are radically distInct tram them and trom each other, and whose
contingency is by no means non-controversial. 15
"Anselm's intuition was that God exists 1n a superior manner, the
ordinary way ot existing being a detect. n16 !he critics have
overlooked this insight, Hartshorne claims,

!hey content them-

selves. otten superficially, with retuting the proposition that
contingent existence adds nothing to a concept.

'''l'hat Anselm ar-

gue. also trom this more dub10us premise does not justi.ty the
critics. dl ? The ways ot the critics Hartshorne tinds strange.
"Here is a man everyone thinks worthy ot retuting. but almost no
one thinks worth studying.d lS Hartshorne has studied Anselm and

l4~., pp. 49-50.
Es8a~s

150harles Hartshorne, The ~!iC ot Pertection and other
in NeOClassical Hetap~iI08
sarle, Ill.: open court,

pp. ()W~.

16n&d •• p. 58.
l7Ibid.
18Ibid •• p.

,2.
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the controversy over his argument as well. The list he gives or
twenty Objections19 to the argument 1s the longest, to the best

ot his knowledge, that has appeared in print.
which he refutes in his book

lh!

ot

thesetwent~t

LoS1c g! Perfection, he has

8ing~

led out three tor special consideration: Kant's argument that existence 1s not a perfection or, to put it another way,non-exlstence 1s not a detect; the positiTist . rgument th,fit there 1s on17
emotive meaning, not cognitional, in the assertion that God ex-

ists; and the crucial lcglcal-tn>e objection that, since existence is concrete, it cannot be on the same logical level as an
abstract predicate, and therefore cannot be conta1ned in it.
Since these three objections are the major ones and since their
refutation invol vea Hartshorne's theory on the argw:r.ent, they
will suffice as a framework tor statlng his position.

His position on the Anselmian argument is midway between
that ot Malcola and Findlay.

One reaSOQ tor this is his approach
He approaohes the subject from a rationalistic pos1t10n20 within
neoolassical metaph7sica. 2l Instead ot employing eaotionally
persuasive arguments, he strives to argue from the basis ot cool,

detached reason.

Instead ot holding tho being, absoluteness, ne-

c ••sity, and substance of classical metaphysics as primary phil-

osophical conceptions, be opts tor creative becoming, event,

19Ibid • , pp. 45-47.
20Ibid • , p. 4.
2l 1bid • , p. ix.

P08-
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Hence, he conceives ot God a8 a changing God and clings to an a priori proof ot His exietence. 22
sibility, and relativity.

Findlay argued that Anselm had proved that the idea ot
God could prove His existence only it God is a necessary existent
But modern logic shows that it-is impossible to have a necessary
existent.

Therefore, instead ot proving the exist@nce ot God.

Anselm laid the basis tor the proof of His non-existence.

Thus

.rindlay forced the issue of choosing "between the view that theiam is logically invalid or impossible and the rejection ot the
doctrine of 'modern logic' that Decessary existenoe is an absur4ity."23

Malcolm believes that existence is not a pertection and

that necessary existence 1s not logically impossible, thereby

aon~

tending the ontological argument in the second torm definitely
proves God's existence rather than His non-existence.

Olaiming

the prool ia atheistic as ",ell as tbeistic, Har<tshorne is in
qualitied agreement with both Maloolm and Findlay.24

Such a po~

'Oion is only •• Qmingly illogioal, becauae it depends upon two
dilterent interpretations of pertection and its existence.

It

the argument is understood in terms ot the classioa1 definition
ot divine pertection. then Hartshorne would agree that Findlay's
insight 1s sound; if the argument is understood in terms ot the
neoclassical definition of divine pertection. then 11alcolm's a.r-

22D~d. , p. 35.
2';rt?&d. , p. 25.
24I'tt!d •• p. 26.
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gumentation is valid.

It is only aocording to the neoclassical

definition. Hartshorne maintains. that God's

existe~ce

can be

proved by ontological interence.
The definitions ot perfection, then,
in the argumentation.
sical definition.

pl~y

Anselm gave all the elements of the clas-

In the Mouolosion, he showed that God is

thing it is good to be by essenoe.

every~

God is the Unlimited, the In-

tin! te, the All-knowing. All-powerful. Unohanging

ot being.

important roles

Completeness

In Him there can be no chunge and tnerei'ore no poten-

In I1im tbere is no beginning, nor end. nor process of devel-

cy_

opment.

Be is pure aot.
Such a definition. by excluding aJl1' admixture of potenti-

ality with God's actuality and any progressive development in
pertection. Hartshorne says, involves logioal diffioulties.
These impasses become apparent in reference to God's operations,
knowledge, and love.

According to the classical view

God could

have Blade other worlds, yet He is still conoeived of as being
without any unaotualized potentialities.

God is all-knowing. yet

His knowledge would have undergone no change if He had created
any one ot a multitude of possible worlds instead of the one Be
has created.
~hat

But surely, liartshorne argues, "it it be denied

there are unactualized potentialities in God, it is oontra-

dictory to say that Be could have produced other worlds, and that
Bo is sure in any case to know the truth. n25
•

I

1

•

25 Ib~d.t p. 37.

According to the

classical view God loves His creatures, yet ae would still reaain
in the same state no matter what world He created.

"B7 defini-

tion. to 'love' is to care about dit.ferenees, and to respond to

them difterently.n26

!be intensity with whioh God loves would

remain the same, but not His state or else His love would be general, undifferentiated by the partioular objeots of Hia love.
As each new person comes into the world God's love becomes greater, His knowledge more extensive, His operation more inclusive.
Eaoh increment in the divine being also indicates unactualized
possibIlities, because after having made a person in a particular
W87 the divine possibility tor making the same person at the same

time in a dirterent way remains torever unactualized.
!he root of the difficulties inherent in the classical
idea ot perteotion i8 the consideration ot God as pure aot.

The

inclu8ion of potentiality in the notion of God is not a detect.
Hen in general agree that a man i8 better or more perfect than aD
amoeba and that God 18 better than both a man and an .aoeba.

An

amoeba has little actuality and potentialit7 tor actions; an ardvark. which can walk and run as well as digest tood, has more ot
both; a man, who can reason and choose trom innumerable possibilities, has tar more; God, then who oan do all things, should be
considered as having intinite potentiality.27

God's perfection
a87 be called the "coinoidence ~ ~os81bilitl ! ! such. Q28 In
26Ibid., p. 36.
27Ibid. t p.

-

'5.

28 Ibid ., p. 38.
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terms of God's knowledge, a possible is something that may be an
object of God's intellection, and an actual, an actually exist1ns
His actuality extends to eaoh

object ot the divino intellection.

and every actuality; His potent1ality, to each and every possibility.

His pertection 1s the modal coincidence of actuality and

possibility.
God is the God of religion, the object of worship.29

As

such He must be worthy at the honor, love, and veneratton no commands.

Through the Bible lIe has told us that we should love Him

with our whole heart, mind, and strength, and that we should love
one another as we love ourselves.
worshipping.

Observing this imperative is

Yet, how can we give all our love to God and still

love ourselves and our neighbor?

!he two commands would be con-

tradictory unless the actualities of creatures be included in God
80

that nothing outside

or

Him

18

loved.

The created values in

creatures must evoke a corresponding interest in God or else theJ
become "a bare nothing, or something external, and genuinely additional, to Ood."'O
illogical.

Either a1ternat1ve is both irreligious and

The God ot pure aot oannot be the God ot religion_

Although always remaining the supre.e being, tar above any oreature no matter how exalted, the God worshipped by men must rise
above Himself in suocessive states.

NAll actuality must be in-

cluded in His aotuality, and all possibility in His potent1al
29Ib1d ., p. 40.

'OIbid •• p. 41.

QC-

tuality.1f3l
Like the classical detinition of divine perteetion, the
neoclassioal 1s a. priori and tolerant ot only necessary existence
Unlike the classical definition, it includes some contingent
properties, is unaffected by the inherent 10g1cal impasses. and
reinforoes the argumentation tor the necessary existence of God
trom His logioal possibility.
Some people are biased against the Anselmian argument beoause they reel that religion is basioally an emotional affair,
and therefore 8ubratlonal, others are biased against it because
they believe religion is a matter of faith, and therefore suprarational.

Neither group deems a oritioal inquiry into the theis-

tic proof necessary or rewarding.
philosophers who reject the

Perhaps the largest group ot

a~~entt

Kant has settled the problem forever.

do so, because they think
All they bave to do is re-

peat what Kant bas written or else give his solution a slightly
difterent slant. 32
But did Kant, great thinker that he was, really solve the

He argued that a hundred real dollars are no better

problem?

than a bundred imaginary dollars.
teotion nor its laok a detect.
is sound.
enough.

Simple existenoe is not a per-

As tar as it goes his reasoning

The only difficulty with it 1s that it does. not go far
"This whole line ot criticism has nothing to do with the

31 Ib1d •

32Ib1d ., pp. 48-49.
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ca.e."33

Hartshorne emphasize. again and again that Kant's chief

criticism, which has echoed and reechoed throughout the years, is
just as empty as the echoes.

Nor does Bume escape the censure.

"Kant and Hume refuted, not the theistic arguments, but their own
admittedly weak, versions ot some arguments tor a substitute tor
theism. tt34
Kant's mistake was to"ep 'he arguaent on the level of
contingent existenoe, instead of raising it to the level ot necess&r,1 existence.
tingency.

Anselm was concerned with necessity, not con-

His inSight was that perfection necessarily exists.

"!bere is, tben, so truly a being than which nothing greater can
be

conceived to exist, that it cannot even

'be

conceived not to

exist; and this being thou art, 0 Lord, our God. ,,35
and necessity no more mix than oil and water.

Contingenc,.

Contingency means

that the subject of a property mayor m&7 not exist.

In regard

to existence, it is neutral.

Neces8it7, on the other hand, is b,.

no means neutral.

sub~ect

Either the

necessarily does not exist.

necessaril,. exists or it

There is no middle ground.

••nt has the irreviaable sodal structure of necessity.

The

argu~

By neces-

slty, Hartshorne .eans analytic necessity, that is, necessity

fol~

lowing upon an understanding of the terms of the proPoslt10n.,6
33Ib1d;., p. 59.
34Ibid., p. 117.

35Deane , .!E..

ill., !l:2!.,

2, 1>P. 8-9.

36uartaborne. .s;m,. !!:!?., p. 53 •

Upon understanding the terms, it is contradictory to speak ot a
pertect being, which exists contingently, just

ot a pertect being, which does not exist.

~5

it 1s to speak

Barring the exolusion

ot contingency leaves but one alternative--necessary existence.

D7 Becker's

Postulate, the statement "it is'talse that it i& nec-

essarily untrue that pertection necessarily exists" striotly taplies that pertection neoe ••arily exists. 3?

In tho oase of con-

tingent existenoe there oan be no interence ot either existent
or non-existent subject; but in the case ot necessary existenc.,
there can be no inference otber than neoessarily existent subject
unless the proposition Ma pertect being necessarily exists" is
meaningless or inconsistent.

!be property-instance distinction

rules out both inconsistency and meaninglessness.,a
Far more powerful than Kant's criticism is the 10g10a1t;n>G objection,

acoord1n~

t()

c,Jhich existencG, being more concrete

than a predicate, 18 on a different logical level.

Existence is

not contained in a predicate, rather it is added to it.

!he uni-

versal pertection Anaelm defines, theretore, cannot contain an
individual which exemplities it. 39 Hence, no inter.nce can be
made trom the predicate to the existence ot its subject.

Hart-

shorne meets this difficulty on three oounts: the uniqueness ot
the pertect being, the necessity ot

37Ibid ., p. 51.
38Ibid. t p. 93.

'9Ibi~. t p. 46.

80me

instanoe of the pertect,
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and the contingency or the partioular exemplification ot the 8en-

eral instance of the perfect.
To speak

ot God i8 not to speak of a man or a fortiori ot

anything else in the universe.

A man is in process from birth to

death, changing continually into different states yet remaining
at the same time his individual self.

This means that, though he

i8 his individuality, only his states exemplify it.

Moreover, he

1s concretized through no proliferation ot specifying predicates.
There has to be an experiential relation, some "this" or "that"
indication. before a man caD be identified as this particular individual.

Being a member

or

a class his individuality oannot be

specified in the order of concepts.

God. on the other hand, is

not, as an individual, a member ot a class.

He is unique; Ue is

absolute perfection, a perfection exemplified in oonsecutive, con
tingent states.

The property-instance distinction, to be sure,

applies to God, but He alooe is defined and designated solely in
abstract terms.

The predicates properly applying to Him oannot

apply to any other individual.

COincidence ot actuality with all

actuality and ot possibility with all possibility is an attribute

ot God 810oe. 40
\

The property-instance distinction requires further explanation.

Men and blue jays may exist.

thia particular blue jay may exist.

This particular man and
This particular man may be

seeing and hearing this particular blue jay singing.
40 Ibid., 66.

The senten-
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cas show at least three levels of existence: the occurrence ot
certain actual states of individuals; the existence of certain
individuals; and the existence ot certain kinds of individuals

or of certain class properties.

A natural necessity exists here;

because, given the kinds, they have to exist in individuals who
are in states; and at the same time there is contingency, because
the kinds mayor may not exist, the exemplifying individual may
be in this or that state.

This conjunction or necessity and con-

tingency in the world of everyday experience provides the ground
tor accepting necessity and contingency or property and instance
in God. 41

By defining God as modal coincidence Hartshorne has a
distinction "between an individual (a) in its abstract identity
and (b) in its concrete actual states. u42

Like Jlan, God is in

process; unlike Dlan, He must exist throughout a process, which
bas no beginning nor end.

ae

is His individual self.

fection yet He has perfect states.

He is per-

The necessity in God is the

necessary existence of some instance, some perfect state.

What

this state will be 1s oorrelated to the ongoing state or the universe and thererore contingent.

To use but one example, God's

actual knowledge includes whatever exists and has existed in the
universe.

As more things come into the world, God's knowledge

increases in a corresponding manner.
er actualization.

He attains a state of

g~

God, as modal coincidence, necessarily knows

4l Ibid ., pp. 63-64.

42~., p. 65.
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whatever is actual as actual and whatever is possible as possible
The content of this necessary knowledge is contingent.

In God:

perfection has two aspects, the absolute aspect, A, which
cannot be surpassed in any way whatever, and the transcendentally relative aspect, or the aspect of transcendent
relativity, R, which is surpassable only by the perfect
itself, not by any other individual. Or better, and positively: as At God surpasses all things save only Himself;
as R, he surpasses all things, including Himselt. 43
God coincides with the property Upertection. "

dividual exists is necessary.

That a perfect in-

The property and its existence are

both on the same logical level of necessity.
state of the individual exists is contingent.

Which particular
~le

property-in-

stance distinction is kept intact; the logical-type objection is
overoome. 44 Though kept intact. the distinction applies to individual and state. not individual and class property.

God's per-

fection is 'fa class of similar and genetically related statea of
one individual. tt45

'rbe classical definition ot perfection allows tor actuality alone.

It provides tor no distinction between property and

instance.

Hence, it cannot withstand the logical-type objection

proposed by Carnap and. others.

Only the neoclassical definition

with its admission of potentiality as well as actuality in God
C&l

bear the onslaught of the powerful objection.

If the Anselm-

ian argument is to prove the existenoe ot God t the classical

43 Ib1d ., p. 67.

-

44 Ib1d •

45 Ibid •

-

def'i~
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nit ion of perfection must cede to the neoclassical.

"Anselm vas

right ••• except ••• that he had no remedy. and coulj have none, for
the Logical-type difficulty and other antinomies in the classical
idea.

Here was his sole essential mistake.,,46

Since the solu-

tion of the logical-type objection involves a necessary eXistent,
a lull refutation or this objection also includes the refutation

of the law of modern logic that all existential statements are
contingent.

The law will be refuted, it it can be shown that at

least one propOSition does not co.e under it.

This can be done

by establishing the criteria for oontingency and seeing if oontin
gency applies to the proposition "perfeotion exists."

Hartshorne

proposes, as the foundation of his major proof, ten marks of contingency.

1'h8

contingent indiTidual is such that it:

(1) By existing prevents some other things (otherwise pos-

sible) troQ 3xisting;

(2) Depends causally tor its existence upon some, but not

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

all other individuals (thus upon those (loming before
but not after it in ti.me);
Could conceivably be known to Gxist by some impe~toct
minds and by Pertect Mind (it this be itselt conceivable). and it could also conceivably be known not to
exist;
Depends, tor the details of its actual qualities, upon
so.e other eXisting things (this qualitative dependence
not being limited to thing(as in <2~ without which it
could not exist);
Is i~selt a causs requirGd tor the existonce or. so~e
other things;
Inoludes in it as ~ctuality the actuality of some other
things as parts or constituents (in a very general
sense). and its potontial states inolude soma ot -the
unrealized possibilities or the universe;
Falla l:fithin som3 quantitative and 'lutllitativo limits
essential to its individual identity. including limits
3.8 to number and kind ot parts.

46

Ibid., p. 83.
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(8) Has, or can be oonceived to have, a beginning at some

time and an ending at some time;
Can
be defined or identified as an Individu~l only em(9)
pirically, a.nd only by some other individuals (not,for
instance, by those entirely before it 1n time), rather
than ~~iversally or by mere unlv8rsal concepts;
(10) Is "good" for some legitimate purposes only. 47
None of the above criteria of oontingency apply to the proposition "perfection exists."
Thougb

God in the concrete exemplification ot his ab-

stract essence does have contingency, He by no means is contingent in His individual selt.
and

exclusiveness.

Contingency entails arbitrariness

The contingent being &ay either be or not be;

it may have these qualities or those; but, granted that it exists
its concept and existence exclude the existence ot incompatible
beings and demands the existence of compatible ones.

The exi8-

tence ot men demands the existence ot air, sufficient warmth, and
nourishment.

The proposition "a san exists- is not compatible

with the proposition "nitrogen 1s the only gas in the universe."
Both propositions are contingent and mutually exclusive.

Necas-

aar" propositions stand with any conSistent, positive statement.
The proposition "perfection exists" is one such statement.

As

Hartshorne puts it:
I hold that the existence of perfection is
oth~r sort of existence v/hatever.
The
its superiority precisely in thiS, bhat it
self regardless of wb.llt else does., or does
selt. It can tolerate or endure any stat9
soever. 48
a.n;y

4?Ibid., pp. 74-75.
48

-Ibid., p. 68.

compatible with
perfect sho~'1s
can maintain itnot., maint"lin 1tof af'.t'airs what-
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God may, ot course, by His own tree action exclude innumerable
things.

By

itself t however .. His existence oann.,:>-4; btt prevented

nor can it prevent anything else trom existing, "because it does

not depend upon any other state ot affairs or conflict with any.
God's creative nature precludes His solitary existence, to be
sure; but His mere existence remains independent ot outside in-

fluences.

In regard to the tirst criterion, the major one of ex-

clusiveness, it may be said that each contingent concept

But the con-

excludes, or restricts some positive possibility.
cept ot perfection does not.
exemplified or impossible.
it must be exemplitied.

specit~~

Theretore it i8 either neceasarl17
Since it is not selt-contradictor.1,

The only question remaining 1s whether

men have rational knowledge or just teel that God exists.
runs the argument from universal existential tolerance. 49

Thus

A common way of discovering the truth or falsity of a
statement is to conoeive or to find a state ot affairs that would
contradict the statement.

A sta.tement that cannot be conceived

to have a contradiction will not be impossible.
"perfection exists" is such a atatement.
pertect knowledge.

The proposition

B.y detinition, God has

Only nothing escapes it.

There is only one

"thing" God does not and cannot know--Hls own non-existenoe.
Since the perfect mind cannot know its own non-existence much
less can the imperfect human mind know it.

H'~ans

could know it
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only by knowing something that would make its existence impossible.

But there is no state of affairs that humans could thus

know. beca.use there is no state of arrairH incom.!>a.tible with God's
existence. 5O

God cannot be conceived

no~ to exist.

Furthermore. the possibility ot Bis existenc. can be conceived.

The perfect mind would certainly know its own existence.

The human mind implicitly knows the existence ot the divine being
To know is to know something.

tor existence.

But everything depends upon God

Whereas it is possible to know the truth of the

propOSition "perfection exists", it ia impossible to know its tal
atty.
at all.

Perrection can have only necessary existence or no sense
In the latter case no judgment can be made, so the tor-

mer must be true. 51

"A thousand scholars, relying on their prade

cessors or contemporaries to have looked into the matter with due
care may say otherwise; but the logical relations ot concepts are
what they are, not 'Ilhat they are !lald to be. "52
criterion does not apply.

!bus the th1rd

The epiatemle proof rules it out.

Every being, both actual and past, becomes part or God's
knowledge and valua.tions.

In order to know these beings which

continually spring trom the divine creatiVity, God must come

a~

ter each ot these belngs--a condition that necessarily requires
God to be everlasting, thus ma.king His non-existence impossible. 54

50Ibid., p. 71.
51I~i4. , p. 72.
52 Ibid • , p. 73.
53!!2!.!!. , p. 80.
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In neoclassical metaph7sics the ideal ot perpetual creation is

never realized, "since the possibilities open to divine and nondivine creativity are absolutely infinite, and their exhaust1ve
actualization is selt-contradictor,y_"54 Both God and the universe continue to develop_
apply.
tion.

The tourth criterion, then,

not

d088

Beings can ultimately result only trom God's creative acTheretore, all things, not merely some arbitrary number

have Him as their cause.

Without Him notbing would exist.

the tilth criterion does not apply.

Thus,

By definition God's actual-

ity is coextensive with the actuality ot all things and His poss1bility with the possibility ot all things.
terion tails to apply.

Thus the sixth cri-

The only limit on God's knowledge and

valuations is the present state ot the world.
top put upon His creatiVity.
ly illimited.

There is no cap or

His individual identity is absolute

Thus the seventh criterion tails to apply.

God

c~

not be conceived to have either a beginning or an end, otherwise
Be would not be the modal COincidence ot actuality and possibility.

Thus the eighth criterion tails to app17_

God is the sole

individual who can be recogD1zed as an individual through the col·
leotion ot universal terms.
class.

ae i8 unique, not a member ot a

No epiatealc relation 18 required tor His individuation.

Thus the ninth criterion tails to app17.
g1timate purposes.

God is good for all le-

To think of His non-existence serves no pur-

pose at allt hence, it is unthinkable.

!hus the tenth criterion
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fails to apply.55

The convergence ot all the criteria present a

most powerful argument on behalf of the Anselmian principle.
From the above, the refutation of the positivists readily
tollows.

The

positivists have the dilemma: ItGod cannot exist

contingently, tor contingency of existence is an imperfection;
but also God cannot exist necessarily, for the necessary is abstract Rod inactual, the mere common factor ot possibility.tt56
They are unable to solve the dilemma, and hence, decide that the
idea of' God can have no cognitive meaninp:.

Men

might feel in

their hearts that God exists but they cannot prove His existence
through rational argumentation.

An immediate argument against

the positivists is that millions of people in the past and present believe the idea ot God 1s significant.
suttice.

Yet this will not

Hartshorne resolves the problem by distinguishing be-

tween classical and neoclassical views of God.

The classical

view is so fraught with logical antinomies that it cannot be used
to solve the dilemma.

The neoclassical view, however, with ita

distinction between the divine individuality and its concrete embodiment in genetically related, contingent states can be admirably used in eliminating the crucial second horn of the dilemma. 57
Necessity is often spoken of as pertaining to the relationship between concepts,and not between concepts and a pgrticu55Ibid ., pp. 8D-81.
56Ibid., p. 114.

-

-

57Ibid •
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lar individual.
are abstract.

The statements so tar made about God, however,
The relations are solely between concepts; hence,

a necessary connection between them can be made.

"Necessity can

perfectly well relate the concept 'pertection' to the concept
'necessarily exemplified property.'
PrinciPle.,,58

And this is exactly Anselm's

God io not an ordinary, limited, pa1~icular indi-

vidual; He is the unique, absolutely unlimited individual.

There

is a distinction between His individual abstract esse.nce and its
necessary exemplification in concrete, particular, genetically re
lated states. "That He exists is non-particular; only

~

ists, or in what state, is exclusive or particular.»59

He ex-

The truth

of the necessary relations 1s consequent upon the very definition

ot neoclassical pertection.
perfection 1s

s1mpl~

"The necessity of the existence of

that a 'predicate so general that any possi-

ble state of affairs wouln embody itt is necessarily embodied,
and this is analytle.»60
teated.

On two accounts the positivists are de-

The necessity ot God's existence is rendered logical and

the meaning of the concept is rendered significant.

The exis-

tence ot God or perfection is neither mea.ningless nor inconsistent.

These, then, are the theories of Malcolm and Hartshorne
on Anselm's ontological argument tor the existence of God.
only remains to evaluate tbem.

58Ib1d., p. 92.
59Ib1d., p. 93.
60Ib1d •

It

CHAPTER IV

A CRITIQUE OF

MALCOLM'S

AND

HARTSHORNE' 8 POSITIONS

Both Malcolm and Hartshorne maintain that Anselm has two
arguments in tl)e Proslogion; one trom contingent existence and
one trom necessary existence.

In both arguments the starting

point is "a being a greater than which cannot be thought."

It it

can be shown that Anselm never attributes anything but necessar,r
existence to this being, Malcolm and Hartshorne will be proven
wrong.

The discu8sion, then, centers around the meaning ot the

phrase "a being a greater than which cannot be thought."
The common note in the various equivalents to the most
frequent tormulation and in the tormula itselt i8 the comparative
tara at the adjective "great."

Ooupled with the words "nothing

••• than" tne comparative "greater" has superlative f'oree.

Indeed

this i8 Anselm's intention; tor, when he speaks ot God whom, contrary to Gaunilo's view, he ldentities as the "being a greater
than which cannot be thought, ft he reters to Him only with superlatives.

In arguing to the existence of' God trom an analYSis at

good things in the world, Anselm concludes to a good that exists
and is good through itselt and through wbich all other goods are
good.

A good preeminent over all others is a supreme good. "But
that which is supremely good 1s also supremely great. nl "And
Inonologion, cb. 2, p. 40.
6Q

The pertinent Latin reference
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since there can be nothing supremely great except what is supreme
1,. good, there must be a being that is greatest and best. 1.e.,
the highest ot all existing beings."2

Whatever is great is great

through this being "which 1s great through itselt.,,3

This being

exists through itself while all other beings exist through it;
consequently, a comparison can be made between the beings.

An-

selm makes the comparison saying;
whatever exists through another is less than that, through
which all things are and which alone exists through itself.
theretore, that which exists through itself exists in the
greatest degree of all things.
There is, then, some one being which alone exists in
the greatest and highest degree ot all. 4
Furthermore, "that which is greatest of all ••• must be supremely
good, and supremely great, and the highest of all existing beings.,,5

At this point is added in the Schmitt edition but not in

the Deane translation: "Therefore, there is something which, whether it be called as essence or a substance or a nature, is the

best and greatest and highest being of all.,,6

This being more-

tor this and the following quotations is given to highlight the
cogency ot the argumentation. This reference is: "summe magnum,"
I, p. 15, 1. 11.
2Ibid., pp. 40-41; " ••• summe magnum ••• maximum ••• id est
summe omnIum," I, p. 15, 11. 21-22.
'Ibid., p. 40; "quod magnum est per seipsum," I, p. 15,

11. 18-19-:--

4Ibid ., ch. 3, p. 42; ft • • • minus ••• maxime omnium est ••••
solum maxIii"'""et summe omnium est," I, p. 16, 11. 20-23.
5Ibid., pp. 42-43; " ••• maxima omnium est ••• samme bonum et
summe magnum, et summum omnium quae aunt." I, p. 16, 11. 23-26.
6Ibid.~, "Quare est aliquid, quod, sive essentia sive substantia s~ntvura dicatur, optimum et maximum est at summum omnium quae sunt;" It p. 16, 11. 26-28.
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over, is "the supreme good being, the supreme great being, being
or subSisting as supreme, that is, the highest of all existing

beings. 1t7

Bow has Anselm used the word "great" thus tar?

He

has used it as an ordinary adjective, as an ordinary adjeotive
modified by the superlative adverb "supremely," as a superlative
adjective, and as a superlative adverb modIfying the verb "is."
That being whioh is supremely great is said to be the one and
only being which is the greatest being, the being which exists in
the greatest degree ot existence.
absolute exoellenoe.

In all oases "great" reters to

By "great," Anselm does not "mean physioal-

ly great, as a material object is great, but that which, the
greater it is, is the better or the more wortby--wisdom, tor instance. ,,8
The being whioh exists in the highest degree is that being which has existenoe through itselt.
etticiently, materially, or tormally.

It is not caused, either

It is the uncaused being,

which oauses all that is.

Such a being cannot come into

tor it has no beginning.

Suoh a being i8 not composite.

existenc~;

"Every-

thing which is oomposite requires tor its subsistenoe the things
of whioh it is oompounded, and, indeed, owes to them the tact of
its existenoe, beoause, whatever it i$, it is through tbese
th1ngs.,,9 This being bas no oauses; it is simple. Being Simple,
7Ib1d. t oh. 4, p. 45; .. summum bonum t summum magnum, sums~Bubaistens t 1d est summum omn1 um quae aunt," It p.
18, 11. 3-4.

mum ens

aIbid.,

-

ah. 2, p. 40.

9Ibid., ah. 17. p. 67.
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it cannot corrupt; being incorruptible, it cannot go out of existence.

Such a being has no end.

A being which is and can have

neither beginning nor end is a necessary being.
When assigning names to God Anselm makes it very clear
that "nothing that is truly said ot' the supreme Being is accepted
1n terms of quality or quantity, but only 1n terms of
is."10

~

it

!he simple pertections Anselm lists such as truth, power,

wisdom, life. beins, and justice, in naming God refer only to His
essence, and in two special ways.

Firat, it any name is applied

to both the supreme Being and creatures "doubtless a very ditferent signitieation ot that name 1s to be understood in its oass.,,11
Secondly, "whatever it 1s essentially in any way, this is all of
wha't 1t 1s, ,,12 so that "this Essenoe 1s always, in every way, sub

stantially identical with itself.,,13

The identifioation of its~

with itself means that all of the names reter to one and the same
thing, although the intelligibilities of the names are different.

To reter to a suprem3ly great being is to reter to the same being
Anselm calls eternal and supremely living.

Life as an attribute

ot the supremely great being means eternal 11te. lite in which
there is no beginning, no end, not even a present as understood
in human terms.

It is ·totally itself all at once.

-

lOIbid.
11 Ibid. , ch. 26. p. 86.
l2 Ibid ., ch. l? p. 67.

-

13 Ibid •• ch. 25. p. 85.
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since for the supreme Being, "it is the same to exist and to live
no better sense can be attache(l to this statement, than that it
exists or

11v~s

eternally, that is, it possesses interminable

life, as a perfect whole at once.,,14

Such a being, indeed, is a

necessary beinJ'.

Thus far the argumentation has been restricted to the
Monologion; but the same conclusion applies to the Proslogion and
..A.nsalm·~

ApologetiC as wall.

In the Proalogion God, the "being a.

greater than wllich cannot be thought, It is still that being ,...hich
"alone exists through itself and creates all other things trom
nothlng,,,15 which "alone among all beings not only do~~ not essse

to be, but also dC:~~,H~: not begin to be .. rtl6 which alone "is, an a
whole, at the same time ever.r~here,"17 which is the life whereby
it lives, the wisdom whereby it 1s wise, the goodn~ss whereby it
is gOOd. 18 And in Anselm's ApologetiC, Anselm makes it clear tha
he has deliberately chosen the formula "a being a greater than
which cannot be thought" rather than the formula "a being a great
er than which cannot be understood."l9
~hich

have.

This being is that being

has all the perfections it is better to have than not to
"Hence, when a being than which a greater is inconceivable

l4 Ibid ., ch. 24, p. 83.
15ProBlogiO~, ch.

5. p. 10.

l6Ibid •• ah. 13, p. 20.
17Ibid.

l8 Ibid., ch. 12, p. 19.
19Anselmts ApologetiC, ch. 5, p. 162.
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is conceived, if it is a being whose non-existence is possible
that is conceived, it is not a being than which a greater cannot
be conoeived. n20 Nowhere does Anselm argue from any existence
other than necessar7 existence.

This is Anselm's point.

The

person who real17 understands that "God is that being than which
a greater cannot be oonceived ••• assuredly understands that this

being so truly exists, that not even in conoept oan it be nonexistent. ,,21

B.7 means ot his formula Anselm has presented a

structure in which all the conoeptua1 content applicable to God
can be placed.
After Malcolm and Hartshorne pOinted out two arguments
for the existence of God in the Proslogion, critios Y. J. Huggett,22 Raziel Abelson,23 and Terence Penelhum24 also mentioned
them.

In pointing out the arguments, Malcolm said that they are

argument:s which Anselm "did not distinguish trom one another,,25
and for which "there is no evidence that he thought of himself as

offering t,,,o different proofs. It26

It is surprising, then, that

2OIbid., ch. 9, p. 169.

21Prosloslon, ch. 5, p. 10.
22W. J. Huggett, "The Nonexistence of Ontological Arguments, tl Philosophical Review, LXXI (June, 1962), p. 377.
23hziel Abelson. "Not Necessarily, It Philosophioal Review, LXX (January, 1961), pp. 6?-68.
24Terence Penelhum "On the Second Ontological Argument,"
Philosophical Review, LXX ~January, 1961), pp. 85-86.
25Malcolm, ~. g!!., p. 41.
26Ibid ., p. 45.
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Malcolm still maintains that there are two distinct arguments.
One may naturally ask why Malcolm does this.

The reason Malcolm,

Hartshorne, and the others distinguish the arguments is that they
do not understand Anselm's thought on this point.

On

the basis

ot the evidence presented above showing that Anselm only thought
of God as necessarily existing, it is here submitted that the
reason why Anselm did not distinguish two different proofs for
the existence of

God and why he did not think of himself as dis-

tinguishing them is the fact that the "arguments" are the same.
Regarding the second part of their argumentation it must
be said that in so far as both Malcolm and Hartshorne argue from
a concept ot a pertect being to the real existence of this being

their arguments are similar and can be refuted with the same objection.

But, since they develop in somewhat different manners

their argument for the validity of the second torm ot the Anselmian argument, each man will be treated separately.
Malcolm's basic principle is that necessary existence is
a property ot God, that the proposition "God neoessarily exists"

by no means signifies "that it follows necessarily tram something
that God exists contingently.,,2?

He also desoribes God as being

unlimited, independent, necessarily omniscient and omnipotent.
All these statements Anselm would endorse.

Malcolm, however, has

tailed to clear the ambiguity in the propositions "God necessarily existsrt and "It is necessary that God exints."

27Ibid., p. 50.

-

Wherea.s the
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former modality is predicated !t!. nt. the latter is predicated
dicto.

1l!

The two propositions are not intrinsically related by

logical ties, because existence is not a real predicate.

Exis-

tence is a logical or formal predicate, a second-level predicate.
which can only be predicated of predicates not things.28

Nor can

making the concept of' God a unique concept bridge the gap.

proffer the uniqueness of the concept ot God as

an

"To

intuitive

ground tor the ontological argument is to abandon rules of logic
tor the eye of faith,,,29 a faith which has tar more foundation
than the argument.
cally true.

The

~

d1cto proposition may well be analyti-

A logically necessary truth, however, is not neoes-

sarily an ontological truth.

Both Malcolm and Hartshorne main-

tain that "God necessarily exists" 1s an analytic proposition.
The critics agree.

That an analytic proposition automatically

applies to the real world, however, is something Allen.'O Penelhum. 3l Plantlnga,32 and Pike 33 deny. According to Penelhum and
Plantings, the proposition "God necessarily exists" springs from
28

Abelson, 22-

~-,

p. 70.

29R_ E. Allen, "The Ontological Argument," Philosophical
Revie'o1f, LXX (January, 1961), p. 59.
30 Ibid., p. 57.

-

31 Penelhum, 22.

~.,

p. 91.

32Alvin Plantlgna, "A Valid Ontological Argument," The
Philosophical Review. LXI (January, 1961), p. 101.
--33Nelson Pike, ReView of The Lo~iC of Perfection and Other E$SIiS !a ~eoclasslcal Meta¥Bfsics,y Cnarles Hartsnorne,--!he Ph osoph1cal RevIew, LXXI
April, 1963), p. 268.

?7
religious sentiment, not from experiential evidence; according to
Allen, existence is not

.'il

predicate; according t·) Pike, the jump

from statements to beings is illicit.
Raziel Abelson goes

~

step further.

1'i!J.lcolm attests that

the propositions It'God is the greatest of all beings,' 'God is
the most perfect belng,' 'God is the 'supreme being',' are logicsIll necessary truths, in the same sense that the statement 'A
square has four sides' is a logically uec98sary truth. ,,34

When

Malcolm equates the two typellJ of pro:posltions, Abelson claims he
also equates the verbs in each ot the propositions.

Existence,

however, as it is used in mathematical equations is such that its
elimination only leads to inconvenient notation.

The con'tent re-

mains unchanged.

The elimination of existence in Malcolm' s formulation, on the other hand, is far trom trivial. 35 Malcolm also
seems to view both theology and mathematics as deductive systems.
Oertainly mathematics is a deductive system; 7et its deductions
are based upon postulates, one of wbich must be existential in
order to avoid a vacuous system and a system in which existence
is never solely based upon a definition.

Postulating the existence of God in any meaningful sense is beggin9; the question. 36
Malcolm merely concludes to what he bas already assumed.

His

formulations would apply to any necessary being or beings wbat34Malcolmt ~.

2!1.,

p.

45.

35Abelson, 2£.~., p. 71.
36Ibid., p. 72.
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ever.

A necessary being necessarily exists, is necessarily omni-

potent, necessarily independent, necessarily unlimited--all ot
these statements and any others that may be made about a necessary being are by definition admittedly true; but none of this
by itself proves the real existence of any necessary being.
merely describes any that may exist.,,3?

"It

The only reason tor be-

lieving in the existence ot the necessary being is the use of the
proper noun "God." 'Since proper names usually or always imply or
presuppose existence, it is easy to slide into the beliet that
what has been named exists, and this is particularly easy when
the entity in question is described in terms of existence. n38
The use of a proper name, however, proves nothing. 39
Hartshorne has four main points: that God is a unique,
absolutely unlimited individual, that Be is defined as the modal
coincidence ot all actuality and possibility, that the argument
has an irreducible modal structure, that the notion ot God·s necessary existence has not only emotional but also cognitional
foundation.

His system stands or falls with his definition ot

God, because it is on the basis ot the abstract-concrete distinction that he handles the logical-type objection, the most power-

ful objection in his opinion to his argumentation.

But his deti-

nition is as fraught with antinomies as he claims the classical
3?Paul Henle, "Uses at the Ontological Argument," The
Philosophical Review, LXX (January, 1961), p. 106.
--}8Ibid.
39Allen,

~.

cit., p. 61.
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idea to be.

For instance, he maintains that to love is to care

for individuals;40 yet how could God care for, provide tor individuals in a meaningful way without foreknowledge?

He maintains

that God cannot depend upon anything for His existence; yet he
also says God cannot exist alone. 4l Further investigation of
this matter is unnecessary; because, even granting his definition

ot God, his position can be retuted.
Hartshorne is correct in claiming that Kant missed the
significance of Anselm's argumentation.
with necessary not contingent existence.
selm t s argument is undeniably mod.al.

God is a necessary being
The structure of An-

The necessary existence of

something eliminates any possibility of its non-existence, should
it exist, and any possibility of its existence should it not
exist.

Modality, in other worda, is tolerant of only one alter-

native.

HartShorne's use of the modal argument, however, has a

fatal weakness.

The crucial steps in his ten-step, partial for-

mulation of the mature form of the argument are six, seven, and
eight. 42 In six, he states that a pertect Being is either necessarily existent or necessarily non-existent; in seven, that it is
not necessarily non-existent; and therefore, in eight, that it is
necessarily existent.

The proposition that it is not necessari17

non-existent is equivalent to the proposition that God's exis4%artshorne, ~.

ill. t

p. 36.

41lli9,., p. 80.

42Murel R. Vogel S.J., Review of The ~eg of Perfection
and Other Essaxs in Neociassical Metaphysi~
arres Hart- •
i1iOrne. The Dew Scno~as'tlc1sm. .x:xxv~~~. .3 l July. 1964). 'D. 411.
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tence is not impossible.

In saying that God's existence is not

impossible, Hartshorne can mean that the notion of God's existence contains no contradiction or else that whether it does or
not is uncertain.

If he means that it is uncertain, the argument

as a whole cannot conclude with certainty that God exists in real

ity with necessary existence.

He cannot mean that the notion of

God's existence contains no contradiction, because he has insulti
cient knowledge of it.43

The seventh step tollows as an intui-

tion trom the conclusions ot arguments

~

aliunde.

"But (7) is

neither an intuition or knowable until we have already proved
that God exists.,,44

The mere concept ot a perfect being is no

proof for the possibility or impossibility of the real existence
of its content.

Not knowing whether or not the notion of God's

existence is self-contradictor.1, Hartshorne cannot reach a positive conclusion about God's real existence.

This line of criti-

ciam applies to Malcolm as well as to Hartshorne.

Whereas Hart-

shorne does not present a proof that the notion ot God's necessary existence is not self-contradictory, Malcolm not only assumes the notion is not selt-contradictory he also maintains that
he cannot prove his contention and that furthermore a proof is
not required. 45 In defense he draws an analogy. Be does not
43JOhn O. Nelson, "Modal Logic and the Ontological Proo!
for God·s Existence," ~ Review .2! Metaphzsics, XVII, 2 (December, 1963), p. 236.
44

Vogel, .2l!. ill,.

45Malcolm,

~.

£!i., p. 60.
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know how to demonstrate the self-consistency of the concept ot a
material being nor of seeing a material being.

Some philosophers

argue that these concepts are self-contradictory, while others
maintain that they are not.

No demonstration, acceptable to all,

exists; yet, these concepts, like the concept of God, play an
important role in human lite.
Hartshorne's lengthy inquiry into the criteria for contingency is both interesting and enlightening.

Untortunately,

his application of the criteria of contingent beings to contingent statements and by contrast to necessary statements and the
concept ot God does not prove the real existence ot the object of
the concept.

"The switch trom talking about contingent belngs

(which are, for example, dependent beings), to talking about contingent jU4s!ents or statements, renders the central theme obscure to the point of being opaque,H46 and invalidating the argument.

But, even if the statement Ifperfection exists" is one ot

the existential judgments not exhibiting any of the ten oontingenoy criteria listed by Hartshorne, still the statement would
not conclusively prove the real existence of such a being.

For

"the concept of a Perfect Being would not prove its real existence unless its non-existenoe were inconoeivable. n4?

God, the

Pertect Being even as described by Hartsborne, oan be thought ot
as non-existent.

Moreover, even granted that a Perfect Being

does exist and necessarily exists, men would not know this fact
46.P1ke,

.sm..

4?Vogel, 22.

ill,., p. 268.

2!!., p. 410.
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as self-evident.

"No analysis ot the concept of Perfeot Being

will aver yield knowledge of any actual existence except the

exls~

tence of the conoept in our mind. r.48
The idea of God, as Hartshorne asserts against the positivists, has a cognitional and not merely an emotional oontent
and foundation.

Hartshorne uses his abstraot-concrete distinc-

tion to overcome the positivists.

The difficulty with dOing this

is that ontological possibility is given priority over actuality.
As Blackwell notes, possibility is consequent upon actuality.49
God is the repository of all possibilities because He is in act
and has infinite power for action.

Whether the classical or the

neo-classical concept of God be used, its automatic application
to the real order is invalid.
necessary

statemen~s.

Statements made about God may be

nPropositions have their own ·being.' whe-

thor they are necessary or contingent notwithstanding; but this
is not the being of actual entities. lt50

Necessity in hum.an know-

ledge does not necessarily impose necessity upon God.

In other

words, real existenoe must be proved from other sources than the
concept.

The proposition "God exists" is, indeed. self-evident

to God, but not to humans who see Him only through an lIunclear
glass. tf
•

48 Ibid., p. 411.

49Ricbard J. Blackwell. Review of The Logic ot Perfection
and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaihysi~ hy Onar!es Hartshame. The ModernSchoo!iiian, XLI. 4 ~May, 1964), 388.

-

50Julian Hartt, ttThe Lo6io of Pertection,tf The Review ot
MetaphysicaL XVI, 4 (June, 196~). p. 755.
----
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The source of the cognitional element in the concept of
God must be clarified, if A...'"lselm' s argumentation is to be under-

stood.

Hartshorne I;laintains that this definition of God, like

Ansa:m's, is entirely a priori;;l and consequently his inferenoe
from it 1s B priori.

Is this so?

"Upon the existence of the

Perfect,n he says, "all other things must depend ••• hence its nonexistence would mean that nothing was even possible, which is
absurd.,,52 How does he knowa.bout this dependence? The answer

seems to be found in an analysis of experience.

An ana.lysis of

experience even yields a knowledge of God's existence; tor itim_

plicltly everyone knows (or at least feels) the divine existence. a ;3

Ma.lcolm holda that An~elm's proof' is valid provided

both the propositiions "God necessarily exists" and "God exists U
are understood as a priori propositions so that the tormer entails the latter, thus making the two statements equiValent. 54
Even though he considers these propositions and Anselm's formula-

tion a priori, he is convinced that Itthere cannot be a deep understanding ot that concept wi't;hout an unders'canding of the phenomenon at human life that gave rise to it.!!5;

He retrains trom.

explioating the origin at length, suggesting only the phenomenon
51Hartshorne, ~.

£!l., p. " .

52 Ibid ., p. 80.
53 Ibid ., p. 110.

54Maloolm, .2l2. ~.,
55r l;lid., p. 60.

p. 50.
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of guilt.

Men are weighed down under the pressure or a tremen-

dous guilt. while at the same time desiring with all their might
that this weight be removed.

The guilt is boundless; so bound-

less must be the mercy that moves it away. The merciful, unlimited God. therefore, must be postulated. 56 In other words. the
argument has an experiential basis.

The

concept of God is formed

through an examination and development of the meaning of empirioal data.
Henry W'olz argues that the whole first chapter of the
Proslogion, the introductory prayer. provides the empIrical basis
of the argument tor the existence o.t God.

'When Anselm says, "I

sought calm in privacy, and I found tribU8tion and grief, in my
inmost thoughts.

I wished to smile in the joy of my mind, and I

am compelled to frown by the sorrow

terance to the fate ot men.

Th~y

at my heart,"'? he gives ut-

glory in their intellect, in

the power or this tremendous faculty; yet this same intellect
forces them to know that their desires will remain unfulfilled,
that their life is doomed to frustration unless a loving God satisfies their cravings.
fection and dependence.

Prayer itself is a recognition of imper-

And a recognition ot imperfection is si-

multaneously a recognition of perfection; because the imperfect
is only known as such in the light of the perfect, the finite, in
the ligbt of the infinite.

The

proofs in the Monologion are all

56Ibld., pp. 60-61.

5?Proslosion, ch. 1, p. 5.
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the same in the sense that they posit a unity before all multiplicity, the existence of one being which is through itself and
through which everything that is is what it is.

Beings posses-

sing an attribute in a greater or less degree have it through a

being which baa it in a perfect degree.

The idea ot a perfect

being is a necessary condition ot knowledge, whereby men know
contingent reality. Without it men could not jUdge. 58 Yet men
do judge.

They judge that they are imperfect, an overwhelmingly

undeniable tact.

It they could be wrong in this judgment, they

could not know anything.

Everything would be unintelligible.

But men have knowledge, so the world is intelligible; since the
world is intelligible, there must be a being giving it intelligibility.
truth.

Such a theory is in accordance with Anselmts theory ot
Wolz, furthermore, asserts that the idea is vague.

is true we cannot say

~

"It

that perfect being is, but we know how

it functions in human knowledge.,,59
expressed in negative terms such

8S

Jor this reason it is best
"a being a greater than which

cannot be thought."
This writer does not entirely agree with Wolz's position.
I hold that Anselm develops his notion ot God. from a causal analysis of himself and other things in the world, and that his tormulation ot God as Ha being a greater than which cannot be

th~t'

is a positive statement summarizing allot the attributes he

58 Henry G. Wolz, "The Empirical Basis ot Anselmts Arguments," ~ Ph1loso~hical Review, LX (July, 1951), p. ;48.

59 Ibid ., p. 354.
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lists in the Monologion and in the Proslosion.

Anselm explicitly

states in the last chapter of his reply to Gaunilo:
I believe that I have shown by an argument which is
not weak, but sufficiently cogent, that in my former book
fProslogioru I proved the real existence ot a being than
w~Ich a greater cannot be conceived; and I belIeve t~
nIs argument oannot be invalIdated by the validity of any
objection. For so great force does the signification of
this reasoning contain in itself, that this being which is
the subject of disoussion. is of necessity. trom tne veryfaot that It-rs understood or conceived, proved also to
exist in reality, and to be whatever we should believe ot
the divine SUbstance. ~ \Jmpnasis miDi.,
--

-

The underlined sections of the passage just quoted show that the
i'ormula Ita being than which a greater cannot be conceived" expres
ses in capsule form "whatever we should believe of the divine

substance. It

Anselm treats "whatever we should believe of the di-

vine substance" in shortened torm in the Proslogion and at length
in his earlier work, the Monologion.

Once the formula has been

well understood several things are known: God's existence and the
attributes that oan be applied to Him.

Anselm stresses a "sound

understanding" of those things whioh a human can know about God.
In the fourth chapter of the Proslogiont he distinguishes between
conceiving of something according to the word signifying it and
according to an understanding of the thing itself.

Only the lat-

ter mode of conceiving God is acceptable in a proof of His existence.

"God 1s that than which a greater cannot be conceived.

And he who thoroughly understands this t assuredly understands
that this being so truly exists. that not even in concept can it
GOAnselmt§ ApologetiC, ch. lOt pp. 169-70.
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be nonexistent. ,,61

The concept of a. being "a greater than which

cannot be thought:' is not amorphous.
detail from an analysis of the world.

It is worked out in some
Anselm aay:; that "nothing

can be ascerta.ined concerning this Nature in terms of. its own
peculiar character, but only in terms of something else,,62 and
that it is Itevident to any ra.tional mind, that by ascending trom
the lesser good to the greater, we can form a considerable notion

ot a being than which a greater is inconce1vab1e. u63
reasoning stated in the second chapter of the

The line ot

~oslogion

ple. because it assumes much that was done before.

is sim-

And this is

consonant with Anselm's method; "tor his writings are related to
one another in this way that the conclusion ot one work is carried forward to become one of the premises of a later work. n64
Only when the empirioal basis of the concept is kept in view can
the concept be applied to reality; but, then, the inference is
not an ontological inference from a purely a priori concept.
11alcolm and Hartshorne would do well to tollow even more closely
Anselm.'s lead.

6lProslog1on, ch. 4, p. 10.
62Moool0510n, ch. 66, p. 131.

63Anselm 's Apologetic, ch. 8, p. 167.
64John McIntyre, "Premises and Ooncluaion in the System
of St. Anselm's Theology," SiiC11.~ium ieccense (Paria: Libraire
Phi1osophiqu~ J. Vrin, 1959'. p.
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